Ошибки пилотов при авиакатастрофах

Жизнь пассажиров зависит от пилотов. Поэтому даже небольшие их ошибки могут привести к катастрофическим последствиям.

Авиакатастрофы происходят относительно редко: в среднем на 11 миллионов полетов приходится всего одна. Но и этого можно избежать, если пилоты будут более осторожны. Эти чрезвычайное происшествия случились из-за неожиданных ошибок пилотов…

Катастрофа А310 под Междуреченском (рейс 593 Аэрофлота, 1994 год). пилот посадил за штурвал своего 15-летнего сына

Возможно, это самая жуткая авария в истории авиации, когда пилот Ярослав Кудринский позволил своим детям играть с управлением самолета.
Катастрофа произошла 23 марта 1994 года, когда самолет Аэрофлота вылетел из Москвы в Гонконг. Кудринский предложил 12-летней Яне и 15-летнему Эльдару в полночь войти в кабину. Эльдар случайно отключил автопилот, что привело к остановке двигателя. Пилот понял, что ситуацию нельзя исправить. А310 упал в Сибири, в результате чего погибли 75 пассажиров и экипаж.

Катастрофа ATR 72 в Тайбэе (рейс 235 Transasia Airways, 2015 год): пилот совершил роковую ошибку после отказа одного из двигателей

«О, Боже! Я нажал не на ту кнопку!» Это были последние слова пилота 4 февраля 2015 года незадолго до того, как самолет врезался в шоссе на Тайване. Погибли 43 человека.
Согласно отчету Тайваньского совета по безопасности полетов, после вылета из аэропорта Соншан в Тайбэе, Тайвань, один из двигателей прекратил работать. Капитан случайно отключил активный двигатель, нажав не на ту кнопку, что и привело к катастрофе.

Катастрофа ATR 72 (рейс 153 Tuninter, 2009 год): пилоты молились вместо того, чтобы предпринимать противоаварийные действия после отказа двигателя

В марте 2009 года капитан и офицер полета были приговорены к 10 годам лишения свободы после авиакатастрофы, в результате которой погибли 16 пассажиров.
Капитану Чафику Аль Гарби и первому офицеру Али Кебаеру-Асваду было предъявлено обвинение в том, что они молились, а не контролировали внештатную ситуацию после того, как у самолета из-за механических сбоев закончилось топливо. Это привело к тому, что самолет упал в Средиземное море.
На записи в кабине видно, как капитан молится Аллаху и Пророку Мухаммеду. Есть доказательства, что экипаж прилагал много усилий, чтобы спасти ситуацию, но, в конце концов, «закрыли на все глаза» и самолет упал в море.
Рейс был из Бари (Италия) в Джербу (Тунис). Только 23 из 49 выживших в катастрофе были спасены из моря.

Катастрофа А321 под Исламабадом (рейс 202 Airblue, 2010 год): первый офицер «потерял уверенность» из-за критики капитана

Авария произошла 28 июля недалеко от столицы Пакистана Исламабад во время внутреннего рейса, в результате чего погибли 146 пассажиров и шесть членов экипажа.
Аварии можно было избежать, если бы первый офицер осмелился противоречить капитану. Однако, из-за частых нападок капитана он потерял уверенность в себе.
Капитан был обвинен в грубом отношении к своему заместителю во время полета. Он даже игнорировал предупреждение Института управления воздушным движением.

В конце концов, из-за сезона дождей капитан испугался потерял контроль над судном, в результате чего самолет врезался в гору.

Катастрофа Boeing 757 под Пуэрто-Плата (рейс ALW 301 Birgenair, 1996 год): причина — осиное гнездо в одной из трубок Пито

В 1996 году коммерческий самолет, вылетевший из Доминиканской Республики в Германию, разбился всего через несколько минут после взлета.
При взлете пилот узнал, что возникли проблемы со спидометром, но решил взлетать.
Сразу после взлета ситуация ухудшилась, поскольку ошибка спидометра влияет на автоматическое рулевое управление.
Самолет упал в Атлантику. Все пассажиры и экипаж погибли.
Следователи установили, что самолет не имел технических повреждений. Но гнездо песочной осы (которое отличается цилиндрической формой) в трубке спидометра повлияло на точность измерения давления, что привело к катастрофе.

Столкновение в аэропорту Лос-Родеос (рейсы KL 4805 KLM и PA1736 Pan American, 1977 год): это самая кровавая авария в истории авиации, в результате которой погибли 583 человека

В марте 1977 года два самолета Boeing 747 авиакомпаний KLM и Pan Am столкнулись в аэропорту Тенерифе (Испания).
Причина заключалась в том, что пилот KLM и Институт управления воздушным движением неправильно поняли друг друга, в результате чего Pan Am остался на взлетно-посадочной полосе в то время, когда KLM собирался взлетать. Из-за густого тумана пилоты самолетов не видели друг друга.
В результате крушения погибли все 248 пассажиров и членов экипажа KLM. На борту Pan Am погибло 326 пассажиров и 9 членов экипажа. 54 пассажира и 7 членов экипажа Pan Am, включая капитана, были тяжело ранены.

Катастрофа Boeing 737 в Вашингтоне (рейс 090 Flight Air Florida, 1982 год): пилот не использовал систему защиты от обледенения на земле и в процессе выруливания

13 февраля 1982 года пилоты совершили многочисленные ошибки во время рейса из Вашингтона, округ Колумбия, в Форт-Лодердейл, штат Флорида. Самым значительным провалом была не работавшая система защиты от обледенения.
Кроме того, во время метели экипаж предпринял неправильные действия, согласившись разбить лёд на аэродинамических поверхностях вместо того, чтобы вернуться и правильно его очистить. Даже после того, как обнаружилось, что отказал двигатель, пилот не отменил взлет.
Самолет упал в реку Потомак через 30 секунд после взлета. Из 79 человек, находившихся на борту, выжили только 5. Еще четыре человека, находившиеся на мосту, погибли во время этой катастрофы.

Катастрофа L-1011 в Эверглейдсе (рейс EAL 401 Eastern Air Lines, 1972 год): пилот менял лампочку

Фото: By Anynobody, from Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0)

29 декабря 1972 года реактивный самолет Eastern Airlines Tristar упал в Национальный парк Эверглейдс во Флориде. 101 человек, включая капитана, погиб. Эту катастрофу пережили 75 человек.
Авария произошла из-за того, что капитан и его заместитель отвлеклись на перегоревшую лампочку.
Пока они проверяли свет, кто-то по ошибке потянул за джойстик, в результате чего самолет потерял режим автопилота и отклонился от курса. Когда пилот понял, что самолет падает, было уже слишком поздно.

По материалам: feedytv

В наши дни полёты самолётами коммерческих авиалиний часто приносят много неожиданностей. Задержки вылета, постоянно меняющиеся правила проноса в самолёт каких-либо предметов, становящиеся чудесным образом всё более тесными кресла, проходы от стоянки до аэропорта, которые периодически переносятся в новое место – всё это никого уже не удивляет.

Но независимо от того, происходит ли всё это в небе или на земле, все эти неприятности усугубляются ещё и трудностями по вине экипажей самолётов. Следующие десять историй посвящены тем ошибкам пилотов и бортпроводников, которые пассажиры ещё не скоро забудут.

10. Неправильное место посадки

В январе 2014 года пассажиров самолёта компании Southwest Airlines довольно сильно встряхнуло, когда их 737-й вдруг резко затормозил практически сразу после посадки. Ему пришлось это сделать, чтобы избежать катастрофы – оказалось, что экипаж перепутал не только взлётно-посадочную полосу, но даже и аэропорт. По словам пилотов, они просто приняли огни ВПП небольшого аэропорта в Миссури за место своего назначения. «Приземление в близлежащем аэропорту вместо намеченного или посадка на неправильную взлётно-посадочную полосу или рулёжную дорожку могли иметь катастрофические последствия», – сказала председатель Совета национальной безопасности транспорта Дебора Герман. После расследования происшествия оба пилота были отправлены в оплачиваемый отпуск, и, в конечном итоге, второй пилот ушёл в отставку.

Однако такие ошибки не так уж и необычны. В 2015 году во время полёта самолёта компании AirAsia из Сиднея в Малайзию капитан ввёл неправильные координаты в навигационную систему самолёта, в итоге самолёт сбился с курса. В конечном итоге все пассажиры благополучно приземлились, но только в Мельбурне.

9. Смельчаки

Два впавших в сентиментальность пилота Air Berlin, по-видимому, не подумали, какое впечатление произведёт на 200 пассажиров задуманный ими трюк. В октябре 2017 года их Airbus A330, направлявшийся из Майами в Берлин, совершал последний трансатлантический полёт этой авиакомпании, и лётчики решили сделать при посадке «почётный круг». Они подумали, что таким образом смогут устроить «достойное и эмоциональное прощание».

Вопреки стандартной процедуре посадки, A330 резко переместился влево, пролетев низко над аэропортом и очень близко к диспетчерской. Манёвр был отмечен воплями пассажиров, опасавшихся за свою жизнь, и подумавших, что через несколько секунд будет крушение. Свидетели на земле, а также сотрудники аэропорта, были тоже потрясены, предполагая, что самолёт сейчас врежется в терминал. «Это было странное чувство. A330 двигался прямо на нас, мы же не знали, что он собирается всего лишь сделать почётный круг», – вспоминает окаменевший от изумления зритель.

Несмотря на то, что посадка прошла благополучно, трюк, а также действия обоих пилотов, которые были немедленно и бессрочно отстранены от полётов, повлёк за собой расследование Федерального авиационного управления (FAA).

8. Предел терпения

У всех у нас есть свой предел терпения. Однако сотруднику JetBlue Стивену Слейтеру его несдержанность в одном конкретном случае стоила работы. В августе 2010 года после посадки самолёта в Международном аэропорту им. Кеннеди одна особо нетерпеливая пассажирка попыталась раньше времени встать и достать свои вещи с верхней полки. Слейтер попросил её не покидать своё место до полной остановки, однако пассажирка не отреагировала. Когда Слейтер подошёл к ней, пассажирка уронила ему на голову свою огромную сумку.

Вместо того чтобы извиниться, путешественница-скандалистка стала оскорблять бортпроводника. Тогда Слейтер объявил по громкой связи, что оскорбившая его пассажирка вынуждает Слейтера пойти на решительные меры. Он взял два бокала пива и нажал на кнопку открывания аварийного эвакуационного лотка. После этого он вылил пиво на голову пассажирке и выкинул её через аварийный люк, положив таким образом конец своей 20-летней карьере бортпроводника.

Позже в тот же день полицейские окружили дом Слейтера, словно речь шла о захвате особо опасного террориста. Они арестовали улыбающегося и уже безработного бортпроводника. Ему было предъявлено обвинение в предумышленном причинении ущерба и угрозе действием. Обвинение было поддержано другими бортпроводниками, которые заявили, что он не должен был реагировать столь эмоционально.

7. Ругань в воздушном пространстве Техаса

По-видимому, в марте 2011 года пилот Southwest Airlines «встал не с той ноги». Находясь в полёте, он отправился к своему второму пилоту, чтобы разразиться отборной руганью. Ничто не запрещает ведение в кабине личных бесед, но в этот раз тирада пилота по случайности транслировалась на всё воздушное пространство Техаса. Причина его раздражения была проста и понятна: возраст, сексуальная ориентация и габариты его коллег.

«У нас есть двенадцать стюардов. Одиннадцать (ругательства) сверх…(ругательства), (ругательства)-гомосексуалистов и одна старуха. Одиннадцать. Только подумай об этом. Я думал, что в Чикаго я буду во всю развлекаться. А вместо этого – толпа из геев, бабушек и толстяков. Теперь я возвращаюсь в Хьюстон, который является одним из самых ужасных мест. Я имею в виду, что и там тоже на несколько милых птенчиков приходится толпа всех этих старых (ругательства) и старух».

По-видимому, когда пилот начал оскорблять своих коллег, управление воздушным движением в Хьюстоне всё-таки решило вмешаться. «Отлично, но кто бы это не говорил, лучше посмотрите, куда вы это говорите», – сказал диспетчер. Можно только представить себе взгляд и внезапную бледность на лице пилота, когда он понял, что микрофон оставался включённым. После того как диспетчеры воздушного движения отправили запись в FAA, пилот был отстранён от полётов без сохранения зарплаты.

6. Когда зовёт природа

Диарея никогда не бывает приятной, особенно если вы находитесь на высоте 11600 метров над землёй и ваше имя – Жоао Корреа. В марте 2009 года через 30 минут полёта «Дельты» из Гондураса в Атланту 43-летний мужчина из Кливленда почувствовал внезапные природные позывы. С трудом сдерживаясь, Корреа попытался пробраться в уборную, но обнаружил, что единственный проход к ней был заблокирован тележкой с напитками. После того как его просьбы воспользоваться туалетом в бизнес-классе были отклонены, Корреа оставалось только терпеливо ждать, но это могло продлиться бесконечно долго.

Чувствуя, что время поджимает, он бросился в бизнес-класс, как олимпийский спринтер, но вновь наткнулся на упрямую стюардессу, решившую играть по правилам. Несмотря на явно острую потребность Корреа, стюардесса встала на его пути и перекрыла рукой доступ к уборной. Действия стюардессы демонстрируют заметный недостаток здравого смысла, учитывая те запахи, на которые она обрекала весь самолёт своей приверженностью к инструкциям. Время поджимало, поэтому Корреа схватил руку стюардессы и вывернул её, чтобы попасть в уборную.

Ему удалось освободить свой кишечник в уединении и правильным образом, но в Атланте Корреа был арестован – после того, как стюардесса обвинила его в нападении. Впоследствии он был обвинён во вмешательстве в действия экипажа, и ему пришлось провести два дня в тюрьме, прежде чем федеральный судья рассмотрел его дело. В итоге он заключил сделку с федеральным прокурором, который согласился отказаться от обвинений, если он пройдёт трехмесячную «программу по профилактике правонарушений».

5. Секс в воздухе (с самим собой)

В последнее десятилетие работе British Airways посвящено множество слухов. Пустые бутылки из-под шампанского, которые выносят из кабины пилотов, драки между стюардами, публичные «ласки» на глазах у пассажиров – словом, скучать не дают. Однако в 2016 году произошёл, наверное, самый нелицеприятный скандал, когда 51-летний капитан Колин Гловер был пойман с поличным.

Появилась серия подробных фотографий (в СМИ), на которых капитан Гловер доставляет себе удовольствие, находясь в кабине на высоте 11600 метров. Порнографический журнал на приборной доске самолёта, чёрные кружевные чулки на капитане и фотографии голого мужчины в туалете самолёта придают этой серии особый шарм.

Скандальные фотографии, как полагают, были сделаны во время двух разных рейсов, хотя некоторые говорят, что в действительности они были сделаны в симуляторе, а не во время реального полёта. Несмотря на то, что капитан Гловер отрицает, что это его фотографии, он был отстранён от полётов на неопределённый срок, пока авиакомпания проводит расследование.

4. «Всё пропало!»

Предполагается, что в критические моменты мы можем брать пример со стюардесс, которые всегда излучают уверенность и спокойствие. Но, хотя мы и ожидаем от них огромного умения владеть собой, иногда человеческая природа берёт верх над любыми навыками. Так произошло в октябре 2017 года, когда во время рейса AirAsia из Пертана в Бали в салоне стало внезапно падать давление, в результате чего самолёт резко снизил высоту полёта на 6700 метров.

Поначалу особой паники не было – до тех пор, пока стюардессы не начали кричать и плакать, в результате чего многие из 145 пассажиров наложили в штаны. Это привело к тому, что пассажиры присоединились к воплям стюардесс и стали орать так, словно они были на концерте дэт-метал – вместо того чтобы вспомнить о своих кислородных масках. В частности, один из пассажиров был так напуган экстравагантным поведением экипажа, что отправил прощальное послание своему сыну. «Паника обострилась из-за поведения сотрудников, которые стали кричать», – написал шокированный пассажир, когда он понял, что гибель никому не угрожает и давление в салоне вскоре будет восстановлено.

После этой поездки на американских горках AirAsia Indonesia принесла извинения «за все доставленные неудобства».

3. Тревожные симптомы

В ноябре 2015 года рейс авиакомпании American Airlines, возвращавшийся из Германии, приземлился в Шарлотте, штат Северная Каролина. Ещё при подготовке к вылету из США несколько стюардесс выказывали обеспокоенность по поводу поведения одной из своих коллег, Джоанны Сноу. Несмотря на то, что они доложили в Федеральную службу воздушных маршалов о неадекватном поведении Сноу, American Airlines отклонила просьбу об её удалении с рейса. Ещё более тревожит то, что Сноу лично сказала маршалу, что она «сумасшедшая» и что им предстоит «крушение».

Во время полёта обеспокоенность стюардесс получила своё подтверждение, Сноу ударила одну из них по лицу. Менее чем через час она несколько раз попыталась вытолкнуть авиационного маршала, сидящего в передней части самолёта, после чего переключилась на маршала, сидевшего в хвосте самолёта. Решив поиграть в Рокки Бальбоа, Сноу ударила одного из офицеров в грудь. Но, несмотря на всё произошедшее, Сноу не была арестована в Германии, и ей разрешили сопровождать на следующий день обратный рейс, в течение которого её психическое состояние ещё больше ухудшилось. Сноу была задержана только после того, как попыталась в Шарлотте уклониться от паспортного контроля. Для этого потребовалось несколько офицеров, Сноу пиналась и кричала.

Сноу обвинили в попытках сорвать работу экипажа и нападении на маршалов авиации. В конце концов, она была освобождена после того, как её признали невиновной по причине безумия. В частности, она перенесла «психический срыв из-за гормональных инъекций против старения».

2. Заключение в уборной

Капитан рейса авиакомпании Chatauqua Airlines перед тем, как заходить на посадку, решил на высоте 3000 метров посетить туалет, но тут произошла целая серия достойных комедийного сериала происшествий. Когда покончивший со своими делами в туалете пилот попытался покинуть уборную, сломалась дверная защёлка, оставив его запертым внутри. Так как до запланированной посадки оставалось всего несколько минут, пилот стал паниковать и стучать в дверь, что привлекло внимание пассажира в первом ряду. Капитан попросил его сообщить своим коллегам, находящимся в кабине, о его нынешнем неловком положении.

К сожалению, акцент добросовестно исполнившего поручение пассажира был похож на «ближневосточный», и это напугало второго пилота и членов экипажа. У них создалось впечатление, что происходит угон. Второй пилот немедленно передал сообщение наземным службам: «Капитан ушёл в хвост самолёта и пропал. Кто-то с сильным иностранным акцентом пытается проникнуть в кабину экипажа. Он говорит, что капитан застрял в туалете и с сильным иностранным акцентом произносит пароль для входа в кабину, но я не собираюсь его впускать».

К счастью для капитана, он сумел выломать дверь туалета как раз вовремя, чтобы успокоить нервы своего пилота и благополучно приземлиться в аэропорту Ла-Гуардия. Однако при посадке самолёт был встречен сотрудниками ФБР и полицией аэропорта. В конечном итоге все поняли, что произошло досадное недоразумение.

1. «Мы все погибнем!»

Иногда стресс от работы вполне способен повредить хрупкий человеческий мозг. Именно это и произошло в 2012 году, когда пилот JetBlue, капитан Клейтон Осбон, перенёс в воздухе приступ умопомрачения, в результате чего его самолёт, летевший в Лас-Вегас, изменил курс и направился в Амарилло, штат Техас. Осбон объявил через интерком: «Это ваш чёртов капитан», после чего стал бегать взад-вперёд по проходу, кричать о нападении террористов и необходимости обратиться к религии: «Молитесь о царстве Иисуса Христа прямо сейчас! Этот самолёт никогда не доберётся до Вегаса! Мы все погибнем!»

Пока испуганные пассажиры готовились к худшему, несколько наиболее храбрых и решительных из них схватили Осбона, связали его и уложили на пол, а первый пилот закрылся внутри кабины.

Несколько месяцев спустя Осбон предстал перед судом штата Техас и был признан невиновным по причине безумия. Возможно, ещё более шокирует тот факт, что после оправдания Осбон имел наглость подать в суд на JetBlue и потребовать почти 15 миллионов долларов за то, что авиакомпания «неоправданно подвергла опасности» чужие жизни, допустив его к полёту, что в конечном итоге стоило ему его карьеры и репутации.

Кроме того, на авиакомпанию JetBlue подали в суд 13 пассажиров из 135, которые были на борту. По словам жителя Бруклина, который решил судиться: «Когда он закричал “Самолёт в свободном падении”, я прочитал молитву и попрощался со всеми, кого я знаю».

Специально для читателей моего блога Muz4in.Net — перевёл Дмитрий Оськин по статье с сайта listverse.com

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1994 Fairchild Air Force Base B-52 crash, caused by flying the aircraft beyond its operational limits. Here the aircraft is seen in an unrecoverable bank, a split second before the crash. This accident is now used in military and civilian aviation environments as a case study in teaching crew resource management.

Actual flight path (red) of TWA Flight 3 from departure to crash point (controlled flight into terrain). Blue line shows the nominal Las Vegas course, while green is a typical course from Boulder. The pilot inadvertently used the Boulder outbound course instead of the appropriate Las Vegas course.

Departure/destination airports and crash site location of Varig Flight 254 (major navigational error leading to fuel exhaustion). The flight plan was later shown to 21 pilots of major airlines. No fewer than 15 pilots committed the same mistake.

Map of the Linate Airport disaster caused by taking the wrong taxiing route (red instead of green), as control tower had not given clear instructions. The accident occurred in thick fog.

The Tenerife airport disaster now serves as a textbook example.[1] Due to several misunderstandings, the KLM flight tried to take off while the Pan Am flight was still on the runway. The airport was accommodating an unusually large number of commercial airliners, resulting in disruption of the normal use of taxiways.

The «three-pointer» design altimeter is one of the most prone to being misread by pilots (a cause of the UA 389 and G-AOVD crashes).

Pilot error generally refers to an accident in which an action or decision made by the pilot was the cause or a contributing factor that led to the accident, but also includes the pilot’s failure to make a correct decision or take proper action.[2] Errors are intentional actions that fail to achieve their intended outcomes.[3] Chicago Convention defines accident as «An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft […] in which […] a person is fatally or seriously injured […] except when the injuries are […] inflicted by other persons.»[4] Hence the definition of the «pilot error» does not include deliberate crash (and such crash is not an accident).

The causes of pilot error include psychological and physiological human limitations. Various forms of threat and error management have been implemented into pilot training programs to teach crew members how to deal with impending situations that arise throughout the course of a flight.[5]

Accounting for the way human factors influence the actions of pilots is now considered standard practice by accident investigators when examining the chain of events that led to an accident.[5][6]

Description[edit]

Modern accident investigators avoid the words «pilot error», as the scope of their work is to determine the cause of an accident, rather than to apportion blame. Furthermore, any attempt to incriminate the pilots does not consider that they are part of a broader system, which in turn may be accountable for their fatigue, work pressure, or lack of training.[6] The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and its member states, therefore adopted James Reason’s model of causation in 1993 in an effort to better understand the role of human factors in aviation accidents.[7]

Pilot error is nevertheless a major cause of air accidents. In 2004, it was identified as the primary reason for 78.6% of disastrous general aviation (GA) accidents, and as the major cause of 75.5% of GA accidents in the United States.[8][better source needed] There are multiple factors that can cause pilot error; mistakes in the decision-making process can be due to habitual tendencies, biases, as well as a breakdown in the processing of the information coming in. For aircraft pilots, in extreme circumstances these errors are highly likely to result in fatalities.[9]

Causes of pilot error[edit]

Pilots work in complex environments and are routinely exposed to high amounts of situational stress in the workplace, inducing pilot error which may result in a threat to flight safety. While aircraft accidents are infrequent, they are highly visible and often involve significant numbers of fatalities. For this reason, research on causal factors and methodologies of mitigating risk associated with pilot error is exhaustive. Pilot error results from physiological and psychological limitations inherent in humans. «Causes of error include fatigue, workload, and fear as well as cognitive overload, poor interpersonal communications, imperfect information processing, and flawed decision making.»[10] Throughout the course of every flight, crews are intrinsically subjected to a variety of external threats and commit a range of errors that have the potential to negatively impact the safety of the aircraft.[11]

Threats[edit]

The term «threat» is defined as any event «external to flight crew’s influence which can increase the operational complexity of a flight.»[12] Threats may further be broken down into environmental threats and airline threats. Environmental threats are ultimately out of the hands of crew members and the airline, as they hold no influence on «adverse weather conditions, air traffic control shortcomings, bird strikes, and high terrain.»[12] Conversely, airline threats are not manageable by the flight crew, but may be controlled by the airline’s management. These threats include «aircraft malfunctions, cabin interruptions, operational pressure, ground/ramp errors/events, cabin events and interruptions, ground maintenance errors, and inadequacies of manuals and charts.»[12]

Errors[edit]

The term «error» is defined as any action or inaction leading to deviation from team or organizational intentions.[10] Error stems from physiological and psychological human limitations such as illness, medication, stress, alcohol/drug abuse, fatigue, emotion, etc. Error is inevitable in humans and is primarily related to operational and behavioral mishaps.[13] Errors can vary from incorrect altimeter setting and deviations from flight course, to more severe errors such as exceeding maximum structural speeds or forgetting to put down landing or takeoff flaps.

Decision making[edit]

Reasons for negative reporting of accidents include staff being too busy, confusing data entry forms, lack of training and less education, lack of feedback to staff on reported data and punitive organizational cultures.[14] Wiegmann and Shappell invented three cognitive models to analyze approximately 4,000 pilot factors associated with more than 2,000 U.S. Navy aviation mishaps. Although the three cognitive models have slight differences in the types of errors, all three lead to the same conclusion: errors in judgment.[15] The three steps are decision-making, goal-setting, and strategy-selection errors, all of which were highly related to primary accidents.[15] For example, on 28 December 2014, AirAsia Flight 8501, which was carrying seven crew members and 155 passengers, crashed into the Java Sea due to several fatal mistakes made by the captain in the poor weather conditions. In this case, the captain chose to exceed the maximum climb rate for a commercial aircraft, which caused a critical stall from which he was unable to recover.[16]

Threat and error management (TEM)[edit]

TEM involves the effective detection and response to internal or external factors that have the potential to degrade the safety of an aircraft’s operations.[11] Methods of teaching TEM stress replicability, or reliability of performance across recurring situations.[17] TEM aims to prepare crews with the «coordinative and cognitive ability to handle both routine and unforeseen surprises and anomalies.»[17] The desired outcome of TEM training is the development of ‘resiliency’. Resiliency, in this context, is the ability to recognize and act adaptively to disruptions which may be encountered during flight operations. TEM training occurs in various forms, with varying levels of success. Some of these training methods include data collection using the line operations safety audit (LOSA), implementation of crew resource management (CRM), cockpit task management (CTM), and the integrated use of checklists in both commercial and general aviation. Some other resources built into most modern aircraft that help minimize risk and manage threat and error are airborne collision and avoidance systems (ACAS) and ground proximity warning systems (GPWS).[18] With the consolidation of onboard computer systems and the implementation of proper pilot training, airlines and crew members look to mitigate the inherent risks associated with human factors.

Line operations safety audit (LOSA)[edit]

LOSA is a structured observational program designed to collect data for the development and improvement of countermeasures to operational errors.[19] Through the audit process, trained observers are able to collect information regarding the normal procedures, protocol, and decision making processes flight crews undertake when faced with threats and errors during normal operation. This data driven analysis of threat and error management is useful for examining pilot behavior in relation to situational analysis. It provides a basis for further implementation of safety procedures or training to help mitigate errors and risks.[12] Observers on flights which are being audited typically observe the following:[19]

  • Potential threats to safety
  • How the threats are addressed by the crew members
  • The errors the threats generate
  • How crew members manage these errors (action or inaction)
  • Specific behaviors known to be associated with aviation accidents and incidents

LOSA was developed to assist crew resource management practices in reducing human error in complex flight operations.[12] LOSA produces beneficial data that reveals how many errors or threats are encountered per flight, the number of errors which could have resulted in a serious threat to safety, and correctness of crew action or inaction. This data has proven to be useful in the development of CRM techniques and identification of what issues need to be addressed in training.[12]

Crew resource management (CRM)[edit]

CRM is the «effective use of all available resources by individuals and crews to safely and effectively accomplish a mission or task, as well as identifying and managing the conditions that lead to error.»[20] CRM training has been integrated and mandatory for most pilot training programs, and has been the accepted standard for developing human factors skills for air crews and airlines. Although there is no universal CRM program, airlines usually customize their training to best suit the needs of the organization. The principles of each program are usually closely aligned. According to the U.S. Navy, there are seven critical CRM skills:[20]

  • Decision making – the use of logic and judgement to make decisions based on available information
  • Assertiveness – willingness to participate and state a given position until convinced by facts that another option is more correct
  • Mission analysis – ability to develop short and long term contingency plans
  • Communication – clear and accurate sending and receiving of information, instructions, commands and useful feedback
  • Leadership – ability to direct and coordinate activities of pilots & crew members
  • Adaptability/flexibility – ability to alter course of action due to changing situations or availability of new information
  • Situational awareness – ability to perceive the environment within time and space, and comprehend its meaning

These seven skills comprise the critical foundation for effective aircrew coordination. With the development and use of these core skills, flight crews «highlight the importance of identifying human factors and team dynamics to reduce human errors that lead to aviation mishaps.»[20]

Application and effectiveness of CRM[edit]

Since the implementation of CRM circa 1979, following the need for increased research on resource management by NASA, the aviation industry has seen tremendous evolution of the application of CRM training procedures.[21] The applications of CRM has been developed in a series of generations:

  • First generation: emphasized individual psychology and testing, where corrections could be made to behavior.
  • Second generation: featured a shift in focus to cockpit group dynamics.
  • Third evolution: diversification of scope and an emphasis on training crews in how they must function both in and out of the cockpit.
  • Fourth generation: CRM integrated procedure into training, allowing organizations to tailor training to their needs.
  • Fifth generation (current): acknowledges that human error is inevitable and provides information to improve safety standards.[22]

Today, CRM is implemented through pilot and crew training sessions, simulations, and through interactions with senior ranked personnel and flight instructors such as briefing and debriefing flights. Although it is difficult to measure the success of CRM programs, studies have been conclusive that there is a correlation between CRM programs and better risk management.[22]

Cockpit task management (CTM)[edit]

Multiple sources of information can be taken from one interface here, known as the PFD, or primary flight display from which pilots receive all of the most important data readings

Cockpit task management (CTM) is the «management level activity pilots perform as they initiate, monitor, prioritize, and terminate cockpit tasks.»[23] A ‘task’ is defined as a process performed to achieve a goal (i.e. fly to a waypoint, descend to a desired altitude).[23] CTM training focuses on teaching crew members how to handle concurrent tasks which compete for their attention. This includes the following processes:

  • Task initiation – when appropriate conditions exist
  • Task monitoring – assessment of task progress and status
  • Task prioritization – relative to the importance and urgency for safety
  • Resource allocation – assignment of human and machine resources to tasks which need completion
  • Task interruption – suspension of lower priority tasks for resources to be allocated to higher priority tasks
  • Task resumption – continuing previously interrupted tasks
  • Task termination – the completion or incompletion of tasks

The need for CTM training is a result of the capacity of human attentional facilities and the limitations of working memory. Crew members may devote more mental or physical resources to a particular task which demands priority or requires the immediate safety of the aircraft.[23] CTM has been integrated to pilot training and goes hand in hand with CRM. Some aircraft operating systems have made progress in aiding CTM by combining instrument gauges into one screen. An example of this is a digital attitude indicator, which simultaneously shows the pilot the heading, airspeed, descent or ascent rate and a plethora of other pertinent information. Implementations such as these allow crews to gather multiple sources of information quickly and accurately, which frees up mental capacity to be focused on other, more prominent tasks.

A military pilot reads the pre-flight checklist prior the mission. Checklists ensure that pilots are able to follow operational procedure and aids in memory recall.

Checklists[edit]

The use of checklists before, during and after flights has established a strong presence in all types of aviation as a means of managing error and reducing the possibility of risk. Checklists are highly regulated and consist of protocols and procedures for the majority of the actions required during a flight.[24] The objectives of checklists include «memory recall, standardization and regulation of processes or methodologies.»[24] The use of checklists in aviation has become an industry standard practice, and the completion of checklists from memory is considered a violation of protocol and pilot error. Studies have shown that increased errors in judgement and cognitive function of the brain, along with changes in memory function are a few of the effects of stress and fatigue.[25] Both of these are inevitable human factors encountered in the commercial aviation industry. The use of checklists in emergency situations also contributes to troubleshooting and reverse examining the chain of events which may have led to the particular incident or crash. Apart from checklists issued by regulatory bodies such as the FAA or ICAO, or checklists made by aircraft manufacturers, pilots also have personal qualitative checklists aimed to ensure their fitness and ability to fly the aircraft. An example is the IM SAFE checklist (illness, medication, stress, alcohol, fatigue/food, emotion) and a number of other qualitative assessments which pilots may perform before or during a flight to ensure the safety of the aircraft and passengers.[24] These checklists, along with a number of other redundancies integrated into most modern aircraft operation systems, ensure the pilot remains vigilant, and in turn, aims to reduce the risk of pilot error.

Notable examples[edit]

One of the most famous examples of an aircraft disaster that was attributed to pilot error was the night-time crash of Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 near Miami, Florida on 29 December 1972. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer had become fixated on a faulty landing gear light and had failed to realize that one of the crew had accidentally bumped the flight controls, altering the autopilot settings from level flight to a slow descent. Told by ATC to hold over a sparsely populated area away from the airport while they dealt with the problem (with, as a result, very few lights visible on the ground to act as an external reference), the distracted flight crew did not notice the plane losing height and the aircraft eventually struck the ground in the Everglades, killing 101 of the 176 passengers and crew. The subsequent National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report on the incident blamed the flight crew for failing to monitor the aircraft’s instruments properly. Details of the incident are now frequently used as a case study in training exercises by aircrews and air traffic controllers.

During 2004 in the United States, pilot error was listed as the primary cause of 78.6% of fatal general aviation accidents, and as the primary cause of 75.5% of general aviation accidents overall.[26] For scheduled air transport, pilot error typically accounts for just over half of worldwide accidents with a known cause.[8]

  • 28 July 1945 – A United States Army Air Forces B-25 bomber bound for Newark Airport crashed into the 79th floor of the Empire State Building after the pilot became lost in a heavy fog bank over Manhattan. All three crewmen were killed as well as eleven office workers in the building.
  • 24 December 1958 – BOAC Bristol Britannia 312, registration G-AOVD, crashed as a result of a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), near Winkton, England, while on a test flight. The crash was caused by a combination of bad weather and a failure on the part of both pilots to read the altimeter correctly. The first officer and two other people survived the crash.
  • 3 January 1961 – Aero Flight 311 crashed near Kvevlax, Finland. All twenty-five occupants were killed in the accident, which was the deadliest in Finnish history. An investigation later determined that both pilots were intoxicated during the flight, and may have been interrupted by a passenger at the time of the crash.
  • 28 February 1966 – American astronauts Elliot See and Charles Bassett were killed when their T-38 Talon crashed into a building at Lambert–St. Louis International Airport during bad weather. A NASA investigation concluded that See had been flying too low on his landing approach.
  • 5 May 1972 — Alitalia Flight 112 crashed into Mount Longa after the flight crew did not adhere to approach procedures established by ATC. All 115 occupants perished. This is the worst single-aircraft disaster in Italian history.
  • 29 December 1972 – Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 crashed into the Florida Everglades after the flight crew failed to notice the deactivation of the plane’s autopilot, having been distracted by their own attempts to solve a problem with the landing gear. Out of 176 occupants, 75 survived the crash.
  • 27 March 1977 – The Tenerife airport disaster: a senior KLM pilot failed to hear, understand or follow instructions from the control tower, causing two Boeing 747s to collide on the runway at Tenerife. A total of 583 people were killed in the deadliest aviation accident in history.
  • 28 December 1978 – United Airlines Flight 173: a flight simulator instructor captain allowed his Douglas DC-8 to run out of fuel while investigating a landing gear problem. United Airlines subsequently changed their policy to disallow «simulator instructor time» in calculating a pilot’s «total flight time». It was thought that a contributory factor to the accident is that an instructor can control the amount of fuel in simulator training so that it never runs out.
  • 13 January 1982 – Air Florida Flight 90, a Boeing 737-200 with 79 passengers and crew, crashed into the 14th Street Bridge and careened into the Potomac River shortly after taking off from Washington National Airport, killing 75 passengers and crew, and four motorists on the bridge. The NTSB report blamed the flight crew for not properly employing the plane’s de-icing system.
  • 19 February 1985 – The crew of China Airlines Flight 006 lost control of their Boeing 747SP over the Pacific Ocean, after the No. 4 engine flamed out. The aircraft descended 30,000 feet in two-and-a-half minutes before control was regained. There were no fatalities but there were several injuries, and the aircraft was badly damaged.
  • 16 August 1987 – The crew of Northwest Airlines Flight 255 omitted their taxi checklist and failed to deploy the aircraft’s flaps and slats. Subsequently, the McDonnell Douglas MD-82 did not gain enough lift on takeoff and crashed into the ground, killing all but one of the 155 people on board, as well as two people on the ground. The sole survivor was a four-year-old girl named Cecelia Cichan, who was seriously injured.
  • 28 August 1988 – The Ramstein airshow disaster: a member of an Italian aerobatic team misjudged a maneuver, causing a mid-air collision. Three pilots and 67 spectators on the ground were killed.
  • 31 August 1988 – Delta Air Lines Flight 1141 crashed on takeoff after the crew forgot to deploy the flaps for increased lift. Of the 108 passengers and crew on board, fourteen were killed.
  • 8 January 1989 – In the Kegworth air disaster, a fan blade broke off in the left engine of a new Boeing 737-400, but the pilots mistakenly shut down the right engine. The left engine eventually failed completely and the crew were unable to restart the right engine before the aircraft crashed. Instrumentation on the 737-400 was different from earlier models, but no flight simulator for the new model was available in Britain.
  • 3 September 1989 – The crew of Varig Flight 254 made a series of mistakes so that their Boeing 737 ran out of fuel hundreds of miles off-course above the Amazon jungle. Thirteen died in the ensuing crash landing.
  • 21 October 1989 – Tan-Sahsa Flight 414 crashed into a hill near Toncontin International Airport in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, because of a bad landing procedure by the pilot, killing 131 of the 146 passengers and crew.
  • 14 February 1990 – Indian Airlines Flight 605 crashed into a golf course short of the runway near Hindustan Airport, India. The flight crew failed to pull up after radio callouts of how close they were into the ground. The plane struck a golf course and an embankment, bursting into flames. Of the 146 occupants on the plane, 92 died, including both flight crew. 54 occupants survived the crash.
  • 24 November 1992 – China Southern Airlines Flight 3943 departed Guangzhou on a 55-minute flight to Guilin. During the descent towards Guilin, at an altitude of 7,000 feet (2,100 m), the captain attempted to level off the plane by raising the nose and the plane’s auto-throttle was engaged for descent. However, the crew failed to notice that the number 2 power lever was at idle, which led to an asymmetrical power condition. The plane crashed on descent to Guilin Airport, killing all 141 on board.
  • 23 March 1994 – Aeroflot Flight 593, an Airbus A310-300, crashed on its way to Hong Kong. The captain, Yaroslav Kudrinsky, invited his two children into the cockpit, and permitted them to sit at the controls, against airline regulations. His sixteen-year-old son, Eldar Kudrinsky, accidentally disconnected the autopilot, causing the plane to bank to the right before diving. The co-pilot brought up the plane too far, causing it to stall and start a flat spin. The pilots eventually recovered the plane, but it crashed into a forest, killing all 75 people on board.
  • 24 June 1994 – B-52 crashes in Fairchild Air Force Base. The crash was largely attributed to the personality and behavior of Lt Col Arthur «Bud» Holland, the pilot in command, and delayed reactions to the earlier incidents involving this pilot. After past histories, Lt Col Mark McGeehan, a USAF squadron commander, refused to allow any of his squadron members to fly with Holland unless he (McGeehan) was also on the aircraft. This crash is now used in military and civilian aviation environments as a case study in teaching crew resource management.
  • 30 June 1994 – Airbus Industrie Flight 129, a certification test flight of the Airbus A330-300, crashed at Toulouse-Blagnac Airport. While simulating an engine-out emergency just after takeoff with an extreme center of gravity location, the pilots chose improper manual settings which rendered the autopilot incapable of keeping the plane in the air, and by the time the captain regained manual control, it was too late. The aircraft was destroyed, killing the flight crew, a test engineer, and four passengers. The investigative board concluded that the captain was overworked from earlier flight testing that day, and was unable to devote sufficient time to the preflight briefing. As a result, Airbus had to revise the engine-out emergency procedures.
  • 2 July 1994 – USAir Flight 1016 crashed into a residential house due to spatial disorientation. 37 passengers were killed and the airplane was destroyed.
  • 20 December 1995 – American Airlines Flight 965, a Boeing 757-200 with 155 passengers and eight crew members, departed Miami approximately two hours behind schedule at 1835 Eastern Standard Time (EST). The investigators believe that the pilot’s unfamiliarity with the modern technology installed in the Boeing 757-200 may have played a role. The pilots did not know their location in relation to a radio beacon in Tulua. The aircraft was equipped to provide that information electronically, but according to sources familiar with the investigation, the pilot apparently did not know how to access the information. The captain input the wrong coordinates, and the aircraft crashed into the mountains, killing 159 of the 163 people on board.
  • 8 May 1997 – China Southern Airlines Flight 3456 crashed into the runway at Shenzhen Huangtian Airport during the crew’s second go-around attempt, killing 35 of the 74 people on board. The crew had unknowingly violated landing procedures, due to heavy weather.
  • 6 August 1997 – Korean Air Flight 801, a Boeing 747-300, crashed into Nimitz Hill, three miles from Guam International Airport, killing 228 of the 254 people on board. The captain’s failure to properly conduct a non-precision approach contributed to the accident. The NTSB said pilot fatigue was a possible factor.
  • 26 September 1997 — Garuda Indonesia Flight 152, an Airbus A300, crashed into a ravine, killing all 234 people on board. The NTSC concluded that the crash was caused when the pilots turned the aircraft in the wrong direction, along with ATC error. Low visibility and failure of the GPWS to activate were cited as contributing factors to the accident.
  • 12 October 1997 – Singer John Denver died when his newly-acquired Rutan Long-EZ home-built aircraft crashed into the Pacific Ocean off Pacific Grove, California. The NTSB indicated that Denver lost control of the aircraft while attempting to manipulate the fuel selector handle, which had been placed in an inaccessible position by the aircraft’s builder. The NTSB cited Denver’s unfamiliarity with the aircraft’s design as a cause of the crash.
  • 16 February 1998 – China Airlines Flight 676 was attempting to land at Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport but had initiate a go-around due to the bad weather conditions. However, the pilots accidentally disengaged the autopilot and did not notice for 11 seconds. When they did notice, the Airbus A300 had entered a stall. The aircraft crashed into a highway and residential area, and exploded, killing all 196 people on board, as well as seven people on the ground.
  • 16 July 1999 – John F. Kennedy, Jr. died when his plane, a Piper Saratoga, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts. The NTSB officially declared that the crash was caused by «the pilot’s failure to maintain control of his airplane during a descent over water at night, which was a result of spatial disorientation». Kennedy did not hold a certification for IFR flight, but did continue to fly after weather conditions obscured visual landmarks.
  • 31 August 1999 – Lineas Aéreas Privadas Argentinas (LAPA) flight 3142 crashed after an attempted take-off with the flaps retracted, killing 63 of the 100 occupants on the plane as well as two people on the ground.
  • 31 October 2000 – Singapore Airlines Flight 006 was a Boeing 747-412 that took off from the wrong runway at the then Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport. It collided with construction equipment on the runway, bursting into flames and killing 83 of its 179 occupants.
  • 12 November 2001 – American Airlines Flight 587 encountered heavy turbulence and the co-pilot over-applied the rudder pedal, turning the Airbus A300 from side to side. The excessive stress caused the rudder to fail. The A300 spun and hit a residential area, crushing five houses and killing 265 people. Contributing factors included wake turbulence and pilot training.
  • 24 November 2001 – Crossair Flight 3597 crashed into a forest on approach to runway 28 at Zurich Airport. This was caused by Captain Lutz descending below the minimum safe altitude of 2400 feet on approach to the runway.
  • 15 April 2002 – Air China Flight 129, a Boeing 767-200, crashed near Busan, South Korea killing 128 of the 166 people on board. The pilot and co-pilot had been flying too low.
  • 25 October 2002 – Eight people, including U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, were killed in a crash near Eveleth, Minnesota. The NTSB concluded that «the flight crew did not monitor and maintain minimum speed.
  • 3 January 2004 – Flash Airlines Flight 604 dived into the Red Sea shortly after takeoff, killing all 148 people on board. The captain had been experiencing vertigo and had not noticed that his control column was slanted to the right. The Boeing 737 banked until it was no longer able to stay in the air. However, the investigation report was disputed.
  • 26 February 2004 – A Beech 200 carrying Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski crashed, killing the president and eight other passengers. The crash investigation ruled that the accident was caused by «procedural mistakes by the crew» during the landing approach.
  • 14 August 2005 – The pilots of Helios Airways Flight 522 lost consciousness, most likely due to hypoxia caused by failure to switch the cabin pressurization to «Auto» during the pre-flight preparations. The Boeing 737-300 crashed after running out of fuel, killing all on board.
  • 16 August 2005 – The crew of West Caribbean Airways Flight 708 unknowingly (and dangerously) decreased the speed of the McDonnell Douglas MD-82, causing it to enter a stall. The situation was incorrectly handled by the crew, with the captain believing that the engines had flamed out, while the first officer, who was aware of the stall, attempted to correct him. The aircraft crashed into the ground near Machiques, Venezuela, killing all 160 people on board.
  • 3 May 2006 – Armavia Flight 967 lost control and crashed into the Black Sea while approaching Sochi-Adler Airport in Russia, killing all 113 people on board. The pilots were fatigued and flying under stressful conditions. Their stress levels were pushed over the limit, causing them to lose their situational awareness.
  • 27 August 2006 – Comair Flight 5191 failed to become airborne and crashed at Blue Grass Airport, after the flight crew mistakenly attempted to take off from a secondary runway that was much shorter than the intended takeoff runway. All but one of the 50 people on board the plane died, including the 47 passengers. The sole survivor was the flight’s first officer, James Polhinke.
  • 1 January 2007 – The crew of Adam Air Flight 574 were preoccupied with a malfunction of the inertial reference system, which diverted their attention from the flight instruments, allowing the increasing descent and bank angle to go unnoticed. Appearing to have become spatially disoriented, the pilots did not detect and appropriately arrest the descent soon enough to prevent loss of control. This caused the aircraft to break up in mid air and crash into the water, killing all 102 people on board.[27]
  • 7 March 2007 – Garuda Indonesia Flight 200: poor Crew Resource Management and the failure to extend the flaps led the aircraft to land at an «unimaginable» speed and run off the end of the runway after landing. Of the 140 occupants, 22 were killed.
  • 17 July 2007 – TAM Airlines Flight 3054: the thrust reverser on the right engine of the Airbus A320 was jammed. Although both crew members were aware, the captain used an outdated braking procedure, and the aircraft overshot the runway and crashed into a building, killing all 187 people on board, as well as 12 people on the ground.
  • 20 August 2008 – The crew of Spanair Flight 5022 failed to deploy the MD-82’s flaps and slats. The flight crashed after takeoff, killing 154 out of the 172 passengers and crew on board.
  • 12 February 2009 – Colgan Air Flight 3407 (flying as Continental Connection) entered a stall and crashed into a house in Clarence Center, New York, due to lack of situational awareness of air speed by the captain and first officer and the captain’s improper reaction to the plane’s stick-shaker stall warning system. All 49 people on board the plane died, as well as one person inside the house.
  • 1 June 2009 – Air France Flight 447 entered a stall and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean following pitot tube failures and improper control inputs by the first officer. All 216 passengers and twelve crew members died.
  • 10 April 2010 – 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash: during a descent towards Russia’s Smolensk North Airport, the flight crew of the Polish presidential jet ignored automatic warnings and attempted a risky landing in heavy fog. The Tupolev Tu-154M descended too low and crashed into a nearby forest; all of the occupants were killed, including Polish president Lech Kaczynski, his wife Maria Kaczynska, and numerous government and military officials.
  • 12 May 2010 – Afriqiyah Airways Flight 771 The aircraft crashed about 1,200 meters (1,300 yd; 3,900 ft) short of Runway 09, outside the perimeter of Tripoli International Airport, killing all but one of the 104 people on board. The sole survivor was a 9-year-old boy named Ruben Van Assouw. On 28 February 2013, the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority announced that the crash was caused by pilot error. Factors that contributed to the crash were lacking/insufficient crew resource management, sensory illusions, and the first officer’s inputs to the aircraft side stick; fatigue could also have played a role in the accident. The final report cited the following causes: the pilots’ lack of a common action plan during the approach, the final approach being continued below the Minimum Decision Altitude without ground visual reference being acquired; the inappropriate application of flight control inputs during the go-around and after the Terrain Awareness and Warning System had been activated; and the flight crew’s failure to monitor and control the flight path.
  • 22 May 2010 – Air India Express Flight 812 overshot the runway at Mangalore Airport, killing 158 people. The plane touched down 610 meters (670 yd) from the usual touchdown point after a steep descent. CVR recordings showed that the captain had been sleeping and had woken up just minutes before the landing. His lack of alertness made the plane land very quickly and steeply and it ran off the end of the tabletop runway.
  • 28 July 2010 – The captain of Airblue Flight 202 became confused with the heading knob and thought that he had carried out the correct action to turn the plane. However, due to his failure to pull the heading knob, the turn was not executed. The Airbus A321 went astray and slammed into the Margalla Hills, killing all 152 people on board.
  • 20 June 2011 – RusAir Flight 9605 crashed onto a motorway while on its final approach to Petrozavodsk Airport in western Russia, after the intoxicated navigator encouraged the captain to land in heavy fog. Only five of the 52 people on board the plane survived the crash.
  • 6 July 2013 – Asiana Airlines Flight 214 tail struck the seawall short of runway 28L at San Francisco International Airport. Of the 307 passengers and crew, three people died and 187 were injured when the aircraft slid down the runway. Investigators said the accident was caused by lower than normal approach speed and incorrect approach path during landing.
  • 23 July 2014 – TransAsia Airways Flight 222 brushed trees and crashed into six houses in a residential area in Xixi Village, Penghu Island, Taiwan. Of the 58 people on board the flight, only ten people survived the crash. The captain was overconfident with his skill and intentionally descended and rolled the plane to the left. Crew members did not realize that they were at a dangerously low altitude and the plane was about to impact terrain until two seconds before the crash.
  • 28 December 2014 — Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501 crashed into the Java Sea as a result of an aerodynamic stall due to pilot error. The aircraft exceeded the climb rate, way beyond its operational limits. All 155 passengers and 7 crew members on board were killed.
  • 6 February 2015 – TransAsia Airways Flight 235: one of the ATR 72’s engines experienced a flameout. As airplanes are able to fly on one engine alone, the pilot then shut down one of the engines. However, he accidentally shut off the engine that was functioning correctly and left the plane powerless, at which point he unsuccessfully tried to restart both engines. The plane then clipped a bridge and plummeted into the Keelung river as the pilot tried to avoid city terrain, killing 43 of the 58 on board.

See also[edit]

  • Airmanship
  • Controlled flight into terrain
  • Environmental causes of aviation stress
  • Human factors in aviation safety
  • Human reliability
  • Jet lag
  • Korean Air Lines Flight 007
  • Pilot fatigue
  • Sensory illusions in aviation
  • Spatial disorientation
  • Stress in the aviation industry
  • Threat and error management
  • User error
  • Kenya Airways Flight 507

References[edit]

  1. ^ «TENERIFE DISASTER – 27 MARCH 1977: The Utility of the Swiss Cheese Model & other Accident Causation Frameworks». Go Flight Medicine. Retrieved 13 October 2014.
  2. ^ Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (2016). U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Standards Service pdf.
  3. ^ Error Management (OGHFA BN). Operator’s Guide to Human Factors in Aviation. Skybrary
  4. ^ How exactly should I understand the term «accidental hull loss»?. Aviation stack overflow
  5. ^ a b «Risk management handbook» (PDF) (Change 1 ed.). Federal Aviation Administration. January 2016. Chapter 2. Human behavior. Retrieved 16 November 2018.
  6. ^ a b Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee (May 2013). «Aviation Accident Investigations» (PDF). Government of Australia.
  7. ^ Investigating Human Error: Incidents, Accidents, and Complex Systems. Ashgate Publishing. 2004. ISBN 0754641228.
  8. ^ a b «Accident statistics». www.planecrashinfo.com. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  9. ^ Foyle, D. C., & Hooey, B. L. (Eds.). (2007). Human performance modeling in aviation. CRC Press.
  10. ^ a b Helmreich, Robert L. (18 March 2000). «On Error Management: Lessons From Aviation». BMJ: British Medical Journal. 320–7237 (7237): 781–785. doi:10.1136/bmj.320.7237.781. PMC 1117774. PMID 10720367.
  11. ^ a b Thomas, Matthew J.W. (2004). «Predictors of Threat and Error Management: Identification of Core Nontechnical Skills and Implications for Training Systems Design». The International Journal of Aviation Psychology. 14 (2): 207–231. doi:10.1207/s15327108ijap1402_6. S2CID 15271960.
  12. ^ a b c d e f Earl, Laurie; Bates, Paul R.; Murray, Patrick S.; Glendon, A. Ian; Creed, Peter A. (January 2012). «Developing a Single-Pilot Line Operations Safety Audit». Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factors. 2 (2): 49–61. doi:10.1027/2192-0923/a000027. hdl:10072/49214. ISSN 2192-0923.
  13. ^ Li, Guohua; Baker, Susan P.; Grabowski, Jurek G.; Rebok, George W. (February 2001). «Factors Associated With Pilot Error in Aviation Crashes». Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine. 72 (1): 52–58. PMID 11194994.
  14. ^ Stanhope, N.; Crowley-Murphy, M. (1999). «An evaluation of adverse incident reporting». Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice. 5 (1): 5–12. doi:10.1046/j.1365-2753.1999.00146.x. PMID 10468379.
  15. ^ a b Wiegmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (2001). Human error perspectives in aviation. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 11(4), 341–357.
  16. ^ Stacey, Daniel (15 January 2015). «Indonesian Air-Traffic Control Is Unsophisticated, Pilots Say». The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 26 January 2015
  17. ^ a b Dekker, Sidney; Lundström, Johan (May 2007). «From Threat and Error Management (TEM) to Resilience». Journal of Human Factors and Aerospace Safety. 260 (70): 1–10.
  18. ^ Maurino, Dan (April 2005). «Threat and Error Management (TEM)». Canadian Aviation Safety Seminar (CASS); Flight Safety and Human Factors Programme – ICAO.
  19. ^ a b «Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA)». SKYbrary. Retrieved 24 August 2016.
  20. ^ a b c Myers, Charles; Orndorff, Denise (2013). «Crew Resource Management: Not Just for Aviators Anymore». Journal of Applied Learning Technology. 3 (3): 44–48.
  21. ^ Helmreich, Robert L.; Merritt, Ashleigh C.; Wilhelm, John A. (1999). «The Evolution of Crew Resource Management Training in Commercial Aviation». The International Journal of Aviation Psychology. 9 (1): 19–32. doi:10.1207/s15327108ijap0901_2. PMID 11541445.
  22. ^ a b Salas, Eduardo; Burke, Shawn C.; Bowers, Clint A.; Wilson, Katherine A. (2001). «Team Training in the Skies: Does Crew Resource Management (CRM) Training Work?». Human Factors. 43 (4): 641–674. doi:10.1518/001872001775870386. ISSN 0018-7208. PMID 12002012. S2CID 23109802.
  23. ^ a b c Chou, Chung-Di; Madhavan, Das; Funk, Ken (1996). «Studies of Cockpit Task Management Errors». The International Journal of Aviation Psychology. 6 (4): 307–320. doi:10.1207/s15327108ijap0604_1.
  24. ^ a b c Hales, Brigette M.; Pronovost, Peter J. (2006). «The Checklist — A Tool for Error Management and Performance». Journal of Critical Care. 21 (3): 231–235. doi:10.1016/j.jcrc.2006.06.002. PMID 16990087.
  25. ^ Cavanagh, James F.; Frank, Michael J.; Allen, John J.B. (April 2010). «Social Stress Reactivity Alters Reward and Punishment Learning». Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. 6 (3): 311–320. doi:10.1093/scan/nsq041. PMC 3110431. PMID 20453038.
  26. ^ «2005 Joseph T. Nall Report» (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 February 2007. Retrieved 12 February 2007.
  27. ^ «Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT/07.01/08.01.36» (PDF). National Transportation Safety Committee, Indonesian Ministry of Transportation. 1 January 2007. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 July 2011. Retrieved 8 June 2013. Aircraft Accident Investigation Report of Indonesian’s National Transportation Safety Committee

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1994 Fairchild Air Force Base B-52 crash, caused by flying the aircraft beyond its operational limits. Here the aircraft is seen in an unrecoverable bank, a split second before the crash. This accident is now used in military and civilian aviation environments as a case study in teaching crew resource management.

Actual flight path (red) of TWA Flight 3 from departure to crash point (controlled flight into terrain). Blue line shows the nominal Las Vegas course, while green is a typical course from Boulder. The pilot inadvertently used the Boulder outbound course instead of the appropriate Las Vegas course.

Departure/destination airports and crash site location of Varig Flight 254 (major navigational error leading to fuel exhaustion). The flight plan was later shown to 21 pilots of major airlines. No fewer than 15 pilots committed the same mistake.

Map of the Linate Airport disaster caused by taking the wrong taxiing route (red instead of green), as control tower had not given clear instructions. The accident occurred in thick fog.

The Tenerife airport disaster now serves as a textbook example.[1] Due to several misunderstandings, the KLM flight tried to take off while the Pan Am flight was still on the runway. The airport was accommodating an unusually large number of commercial airliners, resulting in disruption of the normal use of taxiways.

The «three-pointer» design altimeter is one of the most prone to being misread by pilots (a cause of the UA 389 and G-AOVD crashes).

Pilot error generally refers to an accident in which an action or decision made by the pilot was the cause or a contributing factor that led to the accident, but also includes the pilot’s failure to make a correct decision or take proper action.[2] Errors are intentional actions that fail to achieve their intended outcomes.[3] Chicago Convention defines accident as «An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft […] in which […] a person is fatally or seriously injured […] except when the injuries are […] inflicted by other persons.»[4] Hence the definition of the «pilot error» does not include deliberate crash (and such crash is not an accident).

The causes of pilot error include psychological and physiological human limitations. Various forms of threat and error management have been implemented into pilot training programs to teach crew members how to deal with impending situations that arise throughout the course of a flight.[5]

Accounting for the way human factors influence the actions of pilots is now considered standard practice by accident investigators when examining the chain of events that led to an accident.[5][6]

Description[edit]

Modern accident investigators avoid the words «pilot error», as the scope of their work is to determine the cause of an accident, rather than to apportion blame. Furthermore, any attempt to incriminate the pilots does not consider that they are part of a broader system, which in turn may be accountable for their fatigue, work pressure, or lack of training.[6] The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and its member states, therefore adopted James Reason’s model of causation in 1993 in an effort to better understand the role of human factors in aviation accidents.[7]

Pilot error is nevertheless a major cause of air accidents. In 2004, it was identified as the primary reason for 78.6% of disastrous general aviation (GA) accidents, and as the major cause of 75.5% of GA accidents in the United States.[8][better source needed] There are multiple factors that can cause pilot error; mistakes in the decision-making process can be due to habitual tendencies, biases, as well as a breakdown in the processing of the information coming in. For aircraft pilots, in extreme circumstances these errors are highly likely to result in fatalities.[9]

Causes of pilot error[edit]

Pilots work in complex environments and are routinely exposed to high amounts of situational stress in the workplace, inducing pilot error which may result in a threat to flight safety. While aircraft accidents are infrequent, they are highly visible and often involve significant numbers of fatalities. For this reason, research on causal factors and methodologies of mitigating risk associated with pilot error is exhaustive. Pilot error results from physiological and psychological limitations inherent in humans. «Causes of error include fatigue, workload, and fear as well as cognitive overload, poor interpersonal communications, imperfect information processing, and flawed decision making.»[10] Throughout the course of every flight, crews are intrinsically subjected to a variety of external threats and commit a range of errors that have the potential to negatively impact the safety of the aircraft.[11]

Threats[edit]

The term «threat» is defined as any event «external to flight crew’s influence which can increase the operational complexity of a flight.»[12] Threats may further be broken down into environmental threats and airline threats. Environmental threats are ultimately out of the hands of crew members and the airline, as they hold no influence on «adverse weather conditions, air traffic control shortcomings, bird strikes, and high terrain.»[12] Conversely, airline threats are not manageable by the flight crew, but may be controlled by the airline’s management. These threats include «aircraft malfunctions, cabin interruptions, operational pressure, ground/ramp errors/events, cabin events and interruptions, ground maintenance errors, and inadequacies of manuals and charts.»[12]

Errors[edit]

The term «error» is defined as any action or inaction leading to deviation from team or organizational intentions.[10] Error stems from physiological and psychological human limitations such as illness, medication, stress, alcohol/drug abuse, fatigue, emotion, etc. Error is inevitable in humans and is primarily related to operational and behavioral mishaps.[13] Errors can vary from incorrect altimeter setting and deviations from flight course, to more severe errors such as exceeding maximum structural speeds or forgetting to put down landing or takeoff flaps.

Decision making[edit]

Reasons for negative reporting of accidents include staff being too busy, confusing data entry forms, lack of training and less education, lack of feedback to staff on reported data and punitive organizational cultures.[14] Wiegmann and Shappell invented three cognitive models to analyze approximately 4,000 pilot factors associated with more than 2,000 U.S. Navy aviation mishaps. Although the three cognitive models have slight differences in the types of errors, all three lead to the same conclusion: errors in judgment.[15] The three steps are decision-making, goal-setting, and strategy-selection errors, all of which were highly related to primary accidents.[15] For example, on 28 December 2014, AirAsia Flight 8501, which was carrying seven crew members and 155 passengers, crashed into the Java Sea due to several fatal mistakes made by the captain in the poor weather conditions. In this case, the captain chose to exceed the maximum climb rate for a commercial aircraft, which caused a critical stall from which he was unable to recover.[16]

Threat and error management (TEM)[edit]

TEM involves the effective detection and response to internal or external factors that have the potential to degrade the safety of an aircraft’s operations.[11] Methods of teaching TEM stress replicability, or reliability of performance across recurring situations.[17] TEM aims to prepare crews with the «coordinative and cognitive ability to handle both routine and unforeseen surprises and anomalies.»[17] The desired outcome of TEM training is the development of ‘resiliency’. Resiliency, in this context, is the ability to recognize and act adaptively to disruptions which may be encountered during flight operations. TEM training occurs in various forms, with varying levels of success. Some of these training methods include data collection using the line operations safety audit (LOSA), implementation of crew resource management (CRM), cockpit task management (CTM), and the integrated use of checklists in both commercial and general aviation. Some other resources built into most modern aircraft that help minimize risk and manage threat and error are airborne collision and avoidance systems (ACAS) and ground proximity warning systems (GPWS).[18] With the consolidation of onboard computer systems and the implementation of proper pilot training, airlines and crew members look to mitigate the inherent risks associated with human factors.

Line operations safety audit (LOSA)[edit]

LOSA is a structured observational program designed to collect data for the development and improvement of countermeasures to operational errors.[19] Through the audit process, trained observers are able to collect information regarding the normal procedures, protocol, and decision making processes flight crews undertake when faced with threats and errors during normal operation. This data driven analysis of threat and error management is useful for examining pilot behavior in relation to situational analysis. It provides a basis for further implementation of safety procedures or training to help mitigate errors and risks.[12] Observers on flights which are being audited typically observe the following:[19]

  • Potential threats to safety
  • How the threats are addressed by the crew members
  • The errors the threats generate
  • How crew members manage these errors (action or inaction)
  • Specific behaviors known to be associated with aviation accidents and incidents

LOSA was developed to assist crew resource management practices in reducing human error in complex flight operations.[12] LOSA produces beneficial data that reveals how many errors or threats are encountered per flight, the number of errors which could have resulted in a serious threat to safety, and correctness of crew action or inaction. This data has proven to be useful in the development of CRM techniques and identification of what issues need to be addressed in training.[12]

Crew resource management (CRM)[edit]

CRM is the «effective use of all available resources by individuals and crews to safely and effectively accomplish a mission or task, as well as identifying and managing the conditions that lead to error.»[20] CRM training has been integrated and mandatory for most pilot training programs, and has been the accepted standard for developing human factors skills for air crews and airlines. Although there is no universal CRM program, airlines usually customize their training to best suit the needs of the organization. The principles of each program are usually closely aligned. According to the U.S. Navy, there are seven critical CRM skills:[20]

  • Decision making – the use of logic and judgement to make decisions based on available information
  • Assertiveness – willingness to participate and state a given position until convinced by facts that another option is more correct
  • Mission analysis – ability to develop short and long term contingency plans
  • Communication – clear and accurate sending and receiving of information, instructions, commands and useful feedback
  • Leadership – ability to direct and coordinate activities of pilots & crew members
  • Adaptability/flexibility – ability to alter course of action due to changing situations or availability of new information
  • Situational awareness – ability to perceive the environment within time and space, and comprehend its meaning

These seven skills comprise the critical foundation for effective aircrew coordination. With the development and use of these core skills, flight crews «highlight the importance of identifying human factors and team dynamics to reduce human errors that lead to aviation mishaps.»[20]

Application and effectiveness of CRM[edit]

Since the implementation of CRM circa 1979, following the need for increased research on resource management by NASA, the aviation industry has seen tremendous evolution of the application of CRM training procedures.[21] The applications of CRM has been developed in a series of generations:

  • First generation: emphasized individual psychology and testing, where corrections could be made to behavior.
  • Second generation: featured a shift in focus to cockpit group dynamics.
  • Third evolution: diversification of scope and an emphasis on training crews in how they must function both in and out of the cockpit.
  • Fourth generation: CRM integrated procedure into training, allowing organizations to tailor training to their needs.
  • Fifth generation (current): acknowledges that human error is inevitable and provides information to improve safety standards.[22]

Today, CRM is implemented through pilot and crew training sessions, simulations, and through interactions with senior ranked personnel and flight instructors such as briefing and debriefing flights. Although it is difficult to measure the success of CRM programs, studies have been conclusive that there is a correlation between CRM programs and better risk management.[22]

Cockpit task management (CTM)[edit]

Multiple sources of information can be taken from one interface here, known as the PFD, or primary flight display from which pilots receive all of the most important data readings

Cockpit task management (CTM) is the «management level activity pilots perform as they initiate, monitor, prioritize, and terminate cockpit tasks.»[23] A ‘task’ is defined as a process performed to achieve a goal (i.e. fly to a waypoint, descend to a desired altitude).[23] CTM training focuses on teaching crew members how to handle concurrent tasks which compete for their attention. This includes the following processes:

  • Task initiation – when appropriate conditions exist
  • Task monitoring – assessment of task progress and status
  • Task prioritization – relative to the importance and urgency for safety
  • Resource allocation – assignment of human and machine resources to tasks which need completion
  • Task interruption – suspension of lower priority tasks for resources to be allocated to higher priority tasks
  • Task resumption – continuing previously interrupted tasks
  • Task termination – the completion or incompletion of tasks

The need for CTM training is a result of the capacity of human attentional facilities and the limitations of working memory. Crew members may devote more mental or physical resources to a particular task which demands priority or requires the immediate safety of the aircraft.[23] CTM has been integrated to pilot training and goes hand in hand with CRM. Some aircraft operating systems have made progress in aiding CTM by combining instrument gauges into one screen. An example of this is a digital attitude indicator, which simultaneously shows the pilot the heading, airspeed, descent or ascent rate and a plethora of other pertinent information. Implementations such as these allow crews to gather multiple sources of information quickly and accurately, which frees up mental capacity to be focused on other, more prominent tasks.

A military pilot reads the pre-flight checklist prior the mission. Checklists ensure that pilots are able to follow operational procedure and aids in memory recall.

Checklists[edit]

The use of checklists before, during and after flights has established a strong presence in all types of aviation as a means of managing error and reducing the possibility of risk. Checklists are highly regulated and consist of protocols and procedures for the majority of the actions required during a flight.[24] The objectives of checklists include «memory recall, standardization and regulation of processes or methodologies.»[24] The use of checklists in aviation has become an industry standard practice, and the completion of checklists from memory is considered a violation of protocol and pilot error. Studies have shown that increased errors in judgement and cognitive function of the brain, along with changes in memory function are a few of the effects of stress and fatigue.[25] Both of these are inevitable human factors encountered in the commercial aviation industry. The use of checklists in emergency situations also contributes to troubleshooting and reverse examining the chain of events which may have led to the particular incident or crash. Apart from checklists issued by regulatory bodies such as the FAA or ICAO, or checklists made by aircraft manufacturers, pilots also have personal qualitative checklists aimed to ensure their fitness and ability to fly the aircraft. An example is the IM SAFE checklist (illness, medication, stress, alcohol, fatigue/food, emotion) and a number of other qualitative assessments which pilots may perform before or during a flight to ensure the safety of the aircraft and passengers.[24] These checklists, along with a number of other redundancies integrated into most modern aircraft operation systems, ensure the pilot remains vigilant, and in turn, aims to reduce the risk of pilot error.

Notable examples[edit]

One of the most famous examples of an aircraft disaster that was attributed to pilot error was the night-time crash of Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 near Miami, Florida on 29 December 1972. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer had become fixated on a faulty landing gear light and had failed to realize that one of the crew had accidentally bumped the flight controls, altering the autopilot settings from level flight to a slow descent. Told by ATC to hold over a sparsely populated area away from the airport while they dealt with the problem (with, as a result, very few lights visible on the ground to act as an external reference), the distracted flight crew did not notice the plane losing height and the aircraft eventually struck the ground in the Everglades, killing 101 of the 176 passengers and crew. The subsequent National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report on the incident blamed the flight crew for failing to monitor the aircraft’s instruments properly. Details of the incident are now frequently used as a case study in training exercises by aircrews and air traffic controllers.

During 2004 in the United States, pilot error was listed as the primary cause of 78.6% of fatal general aviation accidents, and as the primary cause of 75.5% of general aviation accidents overall.[26] For scheduled air transport, pilot error typically accounts for just over half of worldwide accidents with a known cause.[8]

  • 28 July 1945 – A United States Army Air Forces B-25 bomber bound for Newark Airport crashed into the 79th floor of the Empire State Building after the pilot became lost in a heavy fog bank over Manhattan. All three crewmen were killed as well as eleven office workers in the building.
  • 24 December 1958 – BOAC Bristol Britannia 312, registration G-AOVD, crashed as a result of a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), near Winkton, England, while on a test flight. The crash was caused by a combination of bad weather and a failure on the part of both pilots to read the altimeter correctly. The first officer and two other people survived the crash.
  • 3 January 1961 – Aero Flight 311 crashed near Kvevlax, Finland. All twenty-five occupants were killed in the accident, which was the deadliest in Finnish history. An investigation later determined that both pilots were intoxicated during the flight, and may have been interrupted by a passenger at the time of the crash.
  • 28 February 1966 – American astronauts Elliot See and Charles Bassett were killed when their T-38 Talon crashed into a building at Lambert–St. Louis International Airport during bad weather. A NASA investigation concluded that See had been flying too low on his landing approach.
  • 5 May 1972 — Alitalia Flight 112 crashed into Mount Longa after the flight crew did not adhere to approach procedures established by ATC. All 115 occupants perished. This is the worst single-aircraft disaster in Italian history.
  • 29 December 1972 – Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 crashed into the Florida Everglades after the flight crew failed to notice the deactivation of the plane’s autopilot, having been distracted by their own attempts to solve a problem with the landing gear. Out of 176 occupants, 75 survived the crash.
  • 27 March 1977 – The Tenerife airport disaster: a senior KLM pilot failed to hear, understand or follow instructions from the control tower, causing two Boeing 747s to collide on the runway at Tenerife. A total of 583 people were killed in the deadliest aviation accident in history.
  • 28 December 1978 – United Airlines Flight 173: a flight simulator instructor captain allowed his Douglas DC-8 to run out of fuel while investigating a landing gear problem. United Airlines subsequently changed their policy to disallow «simulator instructor time» in calculating a pilot’s «total flight time». It was thought that a contributory factor to the accident is that an instructor can control the amount of fuel in simulator training so that it never runs out.
  • 13 January 1982 – Air Florida Flight 90, a Boeing 737-200 with 79 passengers and crew, crashed into the 14th Street Bridge and careened into the Potomac River shortly after taking off from Washington National Airport, killing 75 passengers and crew, and four motorists on the bridge. The NTSB report blamed the flight crew for not properly employing the plane’s de-icing system.
  • 19 February 1985 – The crew of China Airlines Flight 006 lost control of their Boeing 747SP over the Pacific Ocean, after the No. 4 engine flamed out. The aircraft descended 30,000 feet in two-and-a-half minutes before control was regained. There were no fatalities but there were several injuries, and the aircraft was badly damaged.
  • 16 August 1987 – The crew of Northwest Airlines Flight 255 omitted their taxi checklist and failed to deploy the aircraft’s flaps and slats. Subsequently, the McDonnell Douglas MD-82 did not gain enough lift on takeoff and crashed into the ground, killing all but one of the 155 people on board, as well as two people on the ground. The sole survivor was a four-year-old girl named Cecelia Cichan, who was seriously injured.
  • 28 August 1988 – The Ramstein airshow disaster: a member of an Italian aerobatic team misjudged a maneuver, causing a mid-air collision. Three pilots and 67 spectators on the ground were killed.
  • 31 August 1988 – Delta Air Lines Flight 1141 crashed on takeoff after the crew forgot to deploy the flaps for increased lift. Of the 108 passengers and crew on board, fourteen were killed.
  • 8 January 1989 – In the Kegworth air disaster, a fan blade broke off in the left engine of a new Boeing 737-400, but the pilots mistakenly shut down the right engine. The left engine eventually failed completely and the crew were unable to restart the right engine before the aircraft crashed. Instrumentation on the 737-400 was different from earlier models, but no flight simulator for the new model was available in Britain.
  • 3 September 1989 – The crew of Varig Flight 254 made a series of mistakes so that their Boeing 737 ran out of fuel hundreds of miles off-course above the Amazon jungle. Thirteen died in the ensuing crash landing.
  • 21 October 1989 – Tan-Sahsa Flight 414 crashed into a hill near Toncontin International Airport in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, because of a bad landing procedure by the pilot, killing 131 of the 146 passengers and crew.
  • 14 February 1990 – Indian Airlines Flight 605 crashed into a golf course short of the runway near Hindustan Airport, India. The flight crew failed to pull up after radio callouts of how close they were into the ground. The plane struck a golf course and an embankment, bursting into flames. Of the 146 occupants on the plane, 92 died, including both flight crew. 54 occupants survived the crash.
  • 24 November 1992 – China Southern Airlines Flight 3943 departed Guangzhou on a 55-minute flight to Guilin. During the descent towards Guilin, at an altitude of 7,000 feet (2,100 m), the captain attempted to level off the plane by raising the nose and the plane’s auto-throttle was engaged for descent. However, the crew failed to notice that the number 2 power lever was at idle, which led to an asymmetrical power condition. The plane crashed on descent to Guilin Airport, killing all 141 on board.
  • 23 March 1994 – Aeroflot Flight 593, an Airbus A310-300, crashed on its way to Hong Kong. The captain, Yaroslav Kudrinsky, invited his two children into the cockpit, and permitted them to sit at the controls, against airline regulations. His sixteen-year-old son, Eldar Kudrinsky, accidentally disconnected the autopilot, causing the plane to bank to the right before diving. The co-pilot brought up the plane too far, causing it to stall and start a flat spin. The pilots eventually recovered the plane, but it crashed into a forest, killing all 75 people on board.
  • 24 June 1994 – B-52 crashes in Fairchild Air Force Base. The crash was largely attributed to the personality and behavior of Lt Col Arthur «Bud» Holland, the pilot in command, and delayed reactions to the earlier incidents involving this pilot. After past histories, Lt Col Mark McGeehan, a USAF squadron commander, refused to allow any of his squadron members to fly with Holland unless he (McGeehan) was also on the aircraft. This crash is now used in military and civilian aviation environments as a case study in teaching crew resource management.
  • 30 June 1994 – Airbus Industrie Flight 129, a certification test flight of the Airbus A330-300, crashed at Toulouse-Blagnac Airport. While simulating an engine-out emergency just after takeoff with an extreme center of gravity location, the pilots chose improper manual settings which rendered the autopilot incapable of keeping the plane in the air, and by the time the captain regained manual control, it was too late. The aircraft was destroyed, killing the flight crew, a test engineer, and four passengers. The investigative board concluded that the captain was overworked from earlier flight testing that day, and was unable to devote sufficient time to the preflight briefing. As a result, Airbus had to revise the engine-out emergency procedures.
  • 2 July 1994 – USAir Flight 1016 crashed into a residential house due to spatial disorientation. 37 passengers were killed and the airplane was destroyed.
  • 20 December 1995 – American Airlines Flight 965, a Boeing 757-200 with 155 passengers and eight crew members, departed Miami approximately two hours behind schedule at 1835 Eastern Standard Time (EST). The investigators believe that the pilot’s unfamiliarity with the modern technology installed in the Boeing 757-200 may have played a role. The pilots did not know their location in relation to a radio beacon in Tulua. The aircraft was equipped to provide that information electronically, but according to sources familiar with the investigation, the pilot apparently did not know how to access the information. The captain input the wrong coordinates, and the aircraft crashed into the mountains, killing 159 of the 163 people on board.
  • 8 May 1997 – China Southern Airlines Flight 3456 crashed into the runway at Shenzhen Huangtian Airport during the crew’s second go-around attempt, killing 35 of the 74 people on board. The crew had unknowingly violated landing procedures, due to heavy weather.
  • 6 August 1997 – Korean Air Flight 801, a Boeing 747-300, crashed into Nimitz Hill, three miles from Guam International Airport, killing 228 of the 254 people on board. The captain’s failure to properly conduct a non-precision approach contributed to the accident. The NTSB said pilot fatigue was a possible factor.
  • 26 September 1997 — Garuda Indonesia Flight 152, an Airbus A300, crashed into a ravine, killing all 234 people on board. The NTSC concluded that the crash was caused when the pilots turned the aircraft in the wrong direction, along with ATC error. Low visibility and failure of the GPWS to activate were cited as contributing factors to the accident.
  • 12 October 1997 – Singer John Denver died when his newly-acquired Rutan Long-EZ home-built aircraft crashed into the Pacific Ocean off Pacific Grove, California. The NTSB indicated that Denver lost control of the aircraft while attempting to manipulate the fuel selector handle, which had been placed in an inaccessible position by the aircraft’s builder. The NTSB cited Denver’s unfamiliarity with the aircraft’s design as a cause of the crash.
  • 16 February 1998 – China Airlines Flight 676 was attempting to land at Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport but had initiate a go-around due to the bad weather conditions. However, the pilots accidentally disengaged the autopilot and did not notice for 11 seconds. When they did notice, the Airbus A300 had entered a stall. The aircraft crashed into a highway and residential area, and exploded, killing all 196 people on board, as well as seven people on the ground.
  • 16 July 1999 – John F. Kennedy, Jr. died when his plane, a Piper Saratoga, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts. The NTSB officially declared that the crash was caused by «the pilot’s failure to maintain control of his airplane during a descent over water at night, which was a result of spatial disorientation». Kennedy did not hold a certification for IFR flight, but did continue to fly after weather conditions obscured visual landmarks.
  • 31 August 1999 – Lineas Aéreas Privadas Argentinas (LAPA) flight 3142 crashed after an attempted take-off with the flaps retracted, killing 63 of the 100 occupants on the plane as well as two people on the ground.
  • 31 October 2000 – Singapore Airlines Flight 006 was a Boeing 747-412 that took off from the wrong runway at the then Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport. It collided with construction equipment on the runway, bursting into flames and killing 83 of its 179 occupants.
  • 12 November 2001 – American Airlines Flight 587 encountered heavy turbulence and the co-pilot over-applied the rudder pedal, turning the Airbus A300 from side to side. The excessive stress caused the rudder to fail. The A300 spun and hit a residential area, crushing five houses and killing 265 people. Contributing factors included wake turbulence and pilot training.
  • 24 November 2001 – Crossair Flight 3597 crashed into a forest on approach to runway 28 at Zurich Airport. This was caused by Captain Lutz descending below the minimum safe altitude of 2400 feet on approach to the runway.
  • 15 April 2002 – Air China Flight 129, a Boeing 767-200, crashed near Busan, South Korea killing 128 of the 166 people on board. The pilot and co-pilot had been flying too low.
  • 25 October 2002 – Eight people, including U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, were killed in a crash near Eveleth, Minnesota. The NTSB concluded that «the flight crew did not monitor and maintain minimum speed.
  • 3 January 2004 – Flash Airlines Flight 604 dived into the Red Sea shortly after takeoff, killing all 148 people on board. The captain had been experiencing vertigo and had not noticed that his control column was slanted to the right. The Boeing 737 banked until it was no longer able to stay in the air. However, the investigation report was disputed.
  • 26 February 2004 – A Beech 200 carrying Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski crashed, killing the president and eight other passengers. The crash investigation ruled that the accident was caused by «procedural mistakes by the crew» during the landing approach.
  • 14 August 2005 – The pilots of Helios Airways Flight 522 lost consciousness, most likely due to hypoxia caused by failure to switch the cabin pressurization to «Auto» during the pre-flight preparations. The Boeing 737-300 crashed after running out of fuel, killing all on board.
  • 16 August 2005 – The crew of West Caribbean Airways Flight 708 unknowingly (and dangerously) decreased the speed of the McDonnell Douglas MD-82, causing it to enter a stall. The situation was incorrectly handled by the crew, with the captain believing that the engines had flamed out, while the first officer, who was aware of the stall, attempted to correct him. The aircraft crashed into the ground near Machiques, Venezuela, killing all 160 people on board.
  • 3 May 2006 – Armavia Flight 967 lost control and crashed into the Black Sea while approaching Sochi-Adler Airport in Russia, killing all 113 people on board. The pilots were fatigued and flying under stressful conditions. Their stress levels were pushed over the limit, causing them to lose their situational awareness.
  • 27 August 2006 – Comair Flight 5191 failed to become airborne and crashed at Blue Grass Airport, after the flight crew mistakenly attempted to take off from a secondary runway that was much shorter than the intended takeoff runway. All but one of the 50 people on board the plane died, including the 47 passengers. The sole survivor was the flight’s first officer, James Polhinke.
  • 1 January 2007 – The crew of Adam Air Flight 574 were preoccupied with a malfunction of the inertial reference system, which diverted their attention from the flight instruments, allowing the increasing descent and bank angle to go unnoticed. Appearing to have become spatially disoriented, the pilots did not detect and appropriately arrest the descent soon enough to prevent loss of control. This caused the aircraft to break up in mid air and crash into the water, killing all 102 people on board.[27]
  • 7 March 2007 – Garuda Indonesia Flight 200: poor Crew Resource Management and the failure to extend the flaps led the aircraft to land at an «unimaginable» speed and run off the end of the runway after landing. Of the 140 occupants, 22 were killed.
  • 17 July 2007 – TAM Airlines Flight 3054: the thrust reverser on the right engine of the Airbus A320 was jammed. Although both crew members were aware, the captain used an outdated braking procedure, and the aircraft overshot the runway and crashed into a building, killing all 187 people on board, as well as 12 people on the ground.
  • 20 August 2008 – The crew of Spanair Flight 5022 failed to deploy the MD-82’s flaps and slats. The flight crashed after takeoff, killing 154 out of the 172 passengers and crew on board.
  • 12 February 2009 – Colgan Air Flight 3407 (flying as Continental Connection) entered a stall and crashed into a house in Clarence Center, New York, due to lack of situational awareness of air speed by the captain and first officer and the captain’s improper reaction to the plane’s stick-shaker stall warning system. All 49 people on board the plane died, as well as one person inside the house.
  • 1 June 2009 – Air France Flight 447 entered a stall and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean following pitot tube failures and improper control inputs by the first officer. All 216 passengers and twelve crew members died.
  • 10 April 2010 – 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash: during a descent towards Russia’s Smolensk North Airport, the flight crew of the Polish presidential jet ignored automatic warnings and attempted a risky landing in heavy fog. The Tupolev Tu-154M descended too low and crashed into a nearby forest; all of the occupants were killed, including Polish president Lech Kaczynski, his wife Maria Kaczynska, and numerous government and military officials.
  • 12 May 2010 – Afriqiyah Airways Flight 771 The aircraft crashed about 1,200 meters (1,300 yd; 3,900 ft) short of Runway 09, outside the perimeter of Tripoli International Airport, killing all but one of the 104 people on board. The sole survivor was a 9-year-old boy named Ruben Van Assouw. On 28 February 2013, the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority announced that the crash was caused by pilot error. Factors that contributed to the crash were lacking/insufficient crew resource management, sensory illusions, and the first officer’s inputs to the aircraft side stick; fatigue could also have played a role in the accident. The final report cited the following causes: the pilots’ lack of a common action plan during the approach, the final approach being continued below the Minimum Decision Altitude without ground visual reference being acquired; the inappropriate application of flight control inputs during the go-around and after the Terrain Awareness and Warning System had been activated; and the flight crew’s failure to monitor and control the flight path.
  • 22 May 2010 – Air India Express Flight 812 overshot the runway at Mangalore Airport, killing 158 people. The plane touched down 610 meters (670 yd) from the usual touchdown point after a steep descent. CVR recordings showed that the captain had been sleeping and had woken up just minutes before the landing. His lack of alertness made the plane land very quickly and steeply and it ran off the end of the tabletop runway.
  • 28 July 2010 – The captain of Airblue Flight 202 became confused with the heading knob and thought that he had carried out the correct action to turn the plane. However, due to his failure to pull the heading knob, the turn was not executed. The Airbus A321 went astray and slammed into the Margalla Hills, killing all 152 people on board.
  • 20 June 2011 – RusAir Flight 9605 crashed onto a motorway while on its final approach to Petrozavodsk Airport in western Russia, after the intoxicated navigator encouraged the captain to land in heavy fog. Only five of the 52 people on board the plane survived the crash.
  • 6 July 2013 – Asiana Airlines Flight 214 tail struck the seawall short of runway 28L at San Francisco International Airport. Of the 307 passengers and crew, three people died and 187 were injured when the aircraft slid down the runway. Investigators said the accident was caused by lower than normal approach speed and incorrect approach path during landing.
  • 23 July 2014 – TransAsia Airways Flight 222 brushed trees and crashed into six houses in a residential area in Xixi Village, Penghu Island, Taiwan. Of the 58 people on board the flight, only ten people survived the crash. The captain was overconfident with his skill and intentionally descended and rolled the plane to the left. Crew members did not realize that they were at a dangerously low altitude and the plane was about to impact terrain until two seconds before the crash.
  • 28 December 2014 — Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501 crashed into the Java Sea as a result of an aerodynamic stall due to pilot error. The aircraft exceeded the climb rate, way beyond its operational limits. All 155 passengers and 7 crew members on board were killed.
  • 6 February 2015 – TransAsia Airways Flight 235: one of the ATR 72’s engines experienced a flameout. As airplanes are able to fly on one engine alone, the pilot then shut down one of the engines. However, he accidentally shut off the engine that was functioning correctly and left the plane powerless, at which point he unsuccessfully tried to restart both engines. The plane then clipped a bridge and plummeted into the Keelung river as the pilot tried to avoid city terrain, killing 43 of the 58 on board.

See also[edit]

  • Airmanship
  • Controlled flight into terrain
  • Environmental causes of aviation stress
  • Human factors in aviation safety
  • Human reliability
  • Jet lag
  • Korean Air Lines Flight 007
  • Pilot fatigue
  • Sensory illusions in aviation
  • Spatial disorientation
  • Stress in the aviation industry
  • Threat and error management
  • User error
  • Kenya Airways Flight 507

References[edit]

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2018 и 2019 годы запомнятся в истории авиации громкими скандалами с фирмой Boeing: в модели 737 MAX выявили серьезные дефекты. Одна из двух катастроф этого лайнера, унесшая жизни 189 человек, произошла из-за ошибок в работе системы MCAS (система улучшения характеристик управления самолетом). Пока продолжается расследование второй трагедии со 157 погибшими, сотрудники компании ругают руководство за наплевательское отношение к качеству продукции. Трагедии в 2019 году все еще списывают на так называемый «человеческий фактор» — халатность, глупость, самонадеянность и т.д. Ruposters рассказывает об авиационных катастрофах, произошедших исключительно или по большей части из-за безответственности людей в воздухе и на земле.

1973. Катастрофа Ту-104А под Читой

Если судить по официальным сводкам и советской прессе, можно прийти к выводу, что с терроризмом в СССР все обстояло как и с сексом — его попросту не было. В действительности в истории страны насчитываются десятки попыток угона или взрыва самолетов. Все они тщательно засекречивались. Значительная часть атак на объекты авиации была связана с мечтой покинуть пределы Союза. Так случилось и в 1973 году, когда 32-летний уроженец Кировабада Чингис Юнус-оглы Рзаев решил бежать из «великого и могучего» в Китай.

Мужчина тщательно подготовился к нападению. Работая в дорожно-строительном управлении, бывший сапер смог запастись некоторым количеством взрывчатки, после чего соорудил бомбу и купил билет на рейс «Иркутск – Чита».

Все детали произошедшего на борту не будут выяснены уже никогда: не долетев до аэропорта назначения, самолет взорвался в воздухе и рухнул. Погиб 81 человек, то есть все на борту. Очевидцы на земле запомнили чудовищные подробности: с неба падали не только детали обшивки, но и люди. Почему бомба была приведена в действие, хотя целью угонщика было в первую очередь бегство?

Следствию удалось выяснить, что катастрофы можно было бы избежать, если бы не один из пассажиров. Когда боевик объявил о своих требованиях, присутствовавший на борту младший лейтенант милиции Владимир Ежиков решил проявить героизм, уличил момент и выстрелил в Рзаева из табельного оружия. И хотя ранение оказалось смертельным, террорист все же успел активировать бомбу.

Могли бы события развиваться по-другому? По всей видимости, да — это был не единственный угон самолета в Советском Союзе. За три года до этого отец и сын Бразинскасы смогли бежать в Турцию, захватив летевший в Сухуми Ан-24Б. Террористы убили бортпроводницу, ранили командира воздушного судна, штурмана и бортмеханика. В Турции их осудили, но затем амнистировали. Спустя некоторое время Бразинскасам удалось получить убежище в США. Укрывательство убийц еще долгие годы отравляло отношения между Москвой и Вашингтоном, однако в этом случае пассажиры остались живы.

Обломки этого самолета до сих пор лежат в лесах. Кадр из видео пользователя YouTube @suzukoff

Никто и не подумал убрать достаточно крупные части фюзеляжа

1974. Катастрофа DC-10 под Парижем

Если гибель советского Ту-104А стала следствием нелепого стечения обстоятельств и было бы трудно обвинять в ней выполнявшего свой долг милиционера, то произошедшее в Европе на следующий год крушение лайнера DC-10 вполне однозначно описывается двумя словами: вопиющая некомпетентность.

Самолет McDonnell Douglas DC-10 летел по маршруту Стамбул-Париж-Лондон. Ничего не предвещало беды, но вдруг диспетчеры увидели, что точка на радаре разделилась надвое. Спустя несколько секунд в наушниках раздались аварийные сигналы падения давления и превышения скорости, через которые пробилась едва разборчивая фраза: «Фюзеляж взорвался». Лайнер исчез с радаров.

Катастрофа оказалась чудовищной: при наборе высоты в самолете прозвучал громкий хлопок и часть пассажиров вылетели наружу вместе с креслами. DC-10 начал крениться и с огромной скоростью понесся к земле. Падение продолжалось около минуты, после чего самолет рухнул в лес. Его обломки разлетелись на площадь около 70 тысяч квадратных метров. Все погибли.

Расследование быстро установило, что причиной трагедии стали не взрыв, не столкновение и даже не ошибка пилотов. Самолет разрушился из-за открывшейся в полете двери грузового отсека. В ходе следствия выяснилось, что ремонтники неверно истолковали инструкции от производителя — как раз во избежание таких случаев они должны были усилить дефектный механизм замка, но вместо этого ослабили его. Это стоило жизни 346 людям.

Менее чем за год до крушения

1984. Катастрофа Ту-154 под Красноярском

Силовая установка Ту-154 состоит из трех двигателей: два размещены по бокам хвостовой части, а один внутри нее, по центру. Когда вечером 23 декабря 1984 года у самолета, выполнявшего рейс SU-3519 «Красноярск-Иркутск», загорелся один из крайних движков, 27-летний бортинженер Андрей Ресницкий не понял, что именно произошло. Мигали сразу 11 индикаторов неисправности силовой установки, самолет также активировал одну из очередей пожаротушения. Пилоты стабилизировали машину и начали думать, что делать дальше.

Первоначально считалось, что загорелся двигатель №2, центральный. Бортинженеру дали команду его отключить и связались с аэропортом, запросив аварийную посадку. Вскоре Ресницкий увидел ошибку и отрапортовал, как обстояли дела на самом деле: левый двигатель (№1) работает, центральный двигатель (№2) выключен (на самом деле он работал на малой мощности), правый двигатель (№3) горит. Инженер вручную включил систему пожаротушения и отключил загоревшийся мотор, но впопыхах забыл перекрыть поступление топлива. В результате были использованы все три очереди пожаротушения, но результатов это не дало: керосин продолжал поступать к горящему движку, огонь распространился к еще исправному двигателю №2. Именно в этот момент было решено… запустить его.

Спустя минуту экипаж осознал, что теперь у самолета пылают уже два движка. Было решено вновь выключить двигатель №2, но Ресницкий снова забыл перекрыть топливный кран. Остановить пожар было уже невозможно. Пилоты попытались посадить лайнер на двигателе №1, однако из-за пламени отказали системы управления. Самолет критически накренился и рухнул в нескольких километрах от полосы. Погибли 110 человек, включая 7 членов экипажа, при этом одному из пассажиров чудом удалось выжить.

Могила членов экипажа

1984. Катастрофа Ту-154 в Омске

Эта авиакатастрофа считается наиболее крупной в истории России по числу жертв: из 179 находившихся на борту людей выжили лишь пятеро. Трагедия произошла при посадке: лайнер успел коснуться земли и буквально в следующие секунды врезался в снегоуборочные машины. Обе они вспыхнули, поскольку имели емкости с керосином по 7,5 тонн, а Ту-154 тем временем развернуло и изуродовало от удара. Самолет протащило к зданию аэропорта, где он и сгорел вместе с пассажирами. Погибли также 5 бортпроводников и 4 работника наземных служб. Пилотам и одному пассажиру удалось спастись.

Как получилось, что огромный лайнер врезался в аэродромную технику? За некоторое время до катастрофы авиадиспетчер дал разрешение на выезд машин на ВПП, не включив табло «Полоса занята», после чего заснул на рабочем месте. Пилоты могли бы сами предотвратить трагедию, если бы не ряд факторов: в этот день было дождливо, моросящий осадок создавал эффект светового экрана, а аэродромная техника работала без маячков и радиостанций. Виновные получили от 12 до 15 лет тюрьмы.

1986. Катастрофа Ту-134 под Куйбышевым

Если в предыдущем случае можно говорить о хрестоматийном примере безответственности наземных служб, то тут речь пойдет об «отличившихся» пилотах. Порою большой опыт добавляет летчикам излишней самоуверенности. 

20 октября 1986 года Ту-134, выполнявший рейс «Свердловск-Грозный», совершил «жесткую» посадку. Из-за больших перегрузок у самолета надломились шасси, он проскользил по взлетно-посадочной полосе порядка трехсот метров, после чего потерял крыло, разломился надвое и загорелся. Из 85 пассажиров и 8 членов экипажа выжить посчастливилось 24-м людям. Настоящие причины катастрофы шокировали всех: командир экипажа Александр Клюев поспорил со вторым пилотом, что сможет посадить самолет вслепую, по приборам. Для этого он закрыл шторками все окна. Несмотря на хорошие метеоусловия и большой опыт у КВС, он ошибся в расчетах, эксперимент завершился трагично.

По иронии судьбы виновник аварии получил в два раза меньше, чем фигуранты предыдущего дела. Изначально суд приговорил Клюева к 15 годам, но затем смягчил приговор до 6 лет. Второй пилот погиб, спасая пассажиров.

Эти снимки сделал один из пожарных, работавших на месте трагедии. КГБ отобрал пленку, но, по словам фотографа, в последний момент он успел заменить кассету и сохранить снимки у себя 1/2

Эти снимки сделал один из пожарных, работавших на месте трагедии. Сам он рассказывал, что в последний момент успел заменить кассету и предъявить сотрудникам КГБ «чистый» фотоаппарат 2/2

Многим известен аналогичный по уровню безответственности случай, произошедший спустя 8 лет. В 1994 году в кабине Airbus A310 оказались двое детей одного из пилотов и его друг, тоже летчик. 13-летней девочке и 15-летнему подростку дали посидеть за штурвалом.

Экипаж был уверен, что при включенном автопилоте ничего не угрожает, но система отключилась. Самолет начал крениться, о чем сам подросток сообщил отцу. Оказалось, что пилоты попросту не были знакомы с лайнером, поэтому некоторое время они не понимали, что происходит, пока не начались критические перегрузки. Все это время юноша оставался в кресле пилота и пытался выполнять команды, которые ему отдавали сразу три пилота. В какой-то момент, когда ситуация была уже критической, лайнер все-таки удалось вывести из падения и стабилизировать. Командир судна наконец занял свое место и все выдохнули. Зря: оказалось, что высота была критично потеряна, поэтому спустя несколько секунд самолет врезался в сопку, задев верхушки деревьев, а затем разрушился и рухнул рядом с поселком под Междуреченском. Погибли все 75 человек на борту.

1989. Катастрофа Boeing-737 в Кегворте

Ситуации, когда в полете загорался один из двигателей, а экипаж не мог определить, что именно происходит с силовой установкой, происходили и за рубежом. Если в случае с Ту-154 из самолета сложно визуально определить, где произошло возгорание, то этот инцидент с Boeing-737 иначе как абсурдным не назвать — двигатели там подвешены к крыльям и хорошо просматриваются из салона.

В 1989 году у рейса BD092 из Лондона в Белфаст вскоре после взлета начались проблемы с двигателем №1 — произошло отделение лопасти компрессора. Ситуация сопровождалась чрезвычайными вибрациями и задымлением, что повлияло на работу бортовых систем. Командир воздушного судна решил, что произошел отказ двигателя №2, его поддержал и второй пилот, сориентировавшись по неверным данным приборов. Движок был отключен, подача топлива к нему прекратилась, а задымление кабины по случайному совпадению как раз снизилось. Пассажирам объявили, что самолет будет заходить на аварийную посадку из-за проблем с правым двигателем. Никто из них не сказал, что горит на самом деле левая установка, хотя многие это видели.

Свою ошибку экипаж понял, только когда заходил на посадку, — двигатель №1 на тот момент перестал работать окончательно. Была произведена попытка перезапустить двигатель №2, но времени уже не оставалось. Лайнер ударился о землю на скорости немногим выше 212 км/ч и разрушился. 47 человек погибли, 73 были серьезно травмированы. Пилотов первоначально объявили героями, но затем наоборот возложили на них вину.

2008. Катастрофа Boeing-737 в Перми

Хотя и трудно соревноваться в безответственности с пилотом, решившим посадить самолет на спор вслепую, в 2008 году такая попытка была совершена. 14 сентября неподалеку от аэропорта Перми рухнул Boeing 737-505, выполнявший рейс из Москвы. Авиакомпания «Аэрофлот-Норд» сразу заявила о большом опыте у экипажа, однако следствие выявило ряд грубейших ошибок и со стороны компании, и со стороны летчиков.

Неладное пассажиры заметили еще до взлета. Одна из летевших на этом злополучном рейсе отправила SMS знакомому, заявив, что командир судна разговаривает как «совершенно пьяный человек». Было установлено также, что он толком не отдыхал в предыдущие три дня и не успел набрать летную форму. Разбирая записи переговоров и данные приборов, следователи установили: КВС Родион Медведев пребывал в неадекватном состоянии, путал названия эшелонов, постоянно матерился, а когда высота составляла всего 1200 м, вовсе схватился за штурвал и сделал «бочку». Такого маневра гражданский лайнер «простить» не смог и вскоре рухнул.

В первые годы выдвигались самые разные версии крушения. Эксперты нашли у самолета некоторые неполадки, пилотов даже объявляли героями за то, что увели машину от жилых домов. Однако со временем становилось все очевиднее, что смерть всех находившихся на борту 87 человек лежит на совести погибшего командира судна. Против него несколько раз открывали уголовное дело, но хода оно не получило в связи со смертью подозреваемого. В конце 2012 года, спустя 4 года после трагедии, следствие окончательно поставило в этом деле точку, признав пилота единственным виновным.

Какие ошибки пилотов гражданской авиации чаще всего приводят к катастрофе

Ошибки, совершенные пилотами самолетов во время гражданских авиаперевозок, стоят человеческой жизни. Высокая цена платы за невнимательность, нарушение правил пилотирования, является актуальным вопросом и сегодня.

Типичные ошибки пилотов

К основным причинам авиакатастроф относятся:

• несоблюдение рекомендаций АТС. Так, 28.03.1969 года авиалайнер УГА Ан-2, следуя по рейсу Душанбе — Калай-Хумб, потерпел катастрофу из-за нарушения экипажем правил полетов);
• отклонение от заданного маршрута, высоты. 25.12.2016 года авиалайнер Ту-154, следующий из Москвы в Латакию, разбился после 70-секундного пребывания в воздухе. Причина – дезориентация пилота, которая привела к тому, что вместо продолжения набора высоты, летчик начал снижение;
• частичное ознакомление с документацией, в том числе и техническими инструкциями, инструктажами и т.д., их невыполнение. Так, примером может стать 02.10.1996 года катастрофа Boeing 757 под Лимой. Одной из причин падения самолета стало заклеивание лентой систем датчиков скорости-высоты Э. Чакалиаса, который временно выполнял роль ревизора, и не знал всей важности порученной ему стандартной процедуры. Он попросту забыл снять изоляционную ленту;
• ошибки в системах программирования FMS. Такой сбой произошел в планшетах iPad, используемых экипажами. Это привело к задержке 20 авиарейсов. Проанализировав ситуацию, специалисты по безопасности подтвердили, что ошибки в программном обеспечении самолетов «Боингов-787» однозначно привели бы к полной потере управления воздушным кораблем.

По частоте такие нарушения эксплуатации авиатехники уступают только ошибкам, вызванным необходимостью одновременного выполнения нескольких обязанностей пилотом. Многочисленные доклады ASRS свидетельствуют о том, что пилоты являются ответственными лицами в 1/3 всех происходящих инцидентов в воздухе. Главная причина такой статистики – нехватка времени.

Судьбоносная спешка летчиков

В процессе предполетной подготовки нехватка времени на сборы – залог рассеянности, некорректного выполнения обязанностей. Суета возникает, например, в связи с необходимостью принять топливо, внести поправки в базу от синоптической службы, связаться с экспертами-специалистами по контролю техобслуживания самолета, обсудить MEL-ограничения с главным пилотом и т.д. Эти все мероприятия выполняются одновременно, поэтому неудивительно, что можно упустить какой-либо важный момент.

Еще одной «природной» ошибкой пилотов является их «мысленная предрасположенность к спешке». Согласно докладам ученых-исследователей, Мак-Эльхеттона, а также Дрю, 64% от общего числа опрошенных пилотов, включая даже самых опытных, имеют такую эмоциональную склонность.

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Самолеты считаются самым безопасным видом транспорта. Но, несмотря на это, трагических случаев избежать удается не всегда. Причиной катастрофы может стать и техническая неполадка, и попадание птиц в двигатель. Но большая часть авиапроисшествий происходит по вине человеческого фактора. Это может быть ошибка пилотов, их плохое самочувствие или психологическое состояние.

По вине экипажа разбился самолет Boeing 737-800 авиакомпании Flydubai, выполняющий рейс из Дубая в Ростов-на Дону. Экипаж, который в экстремальных погодных условиях принял неверное решение, не смог с первого раза посадить самолет. Выполняя вторую попытку посадки, пилоты совершили противоречивые действия, которые привели к резкому падению самолета. Авиалайнер спикировал на взлетно-посадочную полосу аэропорта и разбился, унеся с собой 62 человеческие жизни. Позднее стало известно, что командир корабля испытывал хроническую усталость и даже засыпал за штурвалом.

«Конечно, человеческий фактор — это основа основ. Но человек должен управлять. Техника есть техника. Это тупой металл, вода, воздух, кислород, азот, метан. Но для чего человек? Человек должен обладать не только просто умом, но и мужественным характером принятия решения, окончательного решения», — уверен заслуженный летчик-испытатель РФ, генерал-майор, Герой России Магомед Толбоев.

Весь мир потрясла трагедия, которая произошла во французских Альпах в 2015 году. 24 марта самолет авиакомпании German Wings Airbus A320 потерпел крушение в Прованских Альпах. Через 30 минут после взлета самолет внезапно перешел в быстрое снижение и еще через 10 минут врезался в горный склон и полностью разрушился. Все находившиеся на его борту 150 человек погибли. Причиной катастрофы стало самоубийство 28-летнего пилота Андреаса Лубицы.

Известно, что до катастрофы он несколько лет наблюдался у психиатров. В 2009 году Лубиц на полтора года прервал обучение в бременской школе пилотов Lufthansa из-за глубокой депрессии. А в 2013 году он сдал летные экзамены и был принят на работу в дочернюю компанию Lufthansa — German Wings. Лубиц прошел все тесты и был признан комиссией годным. Но он по-прежнему, страдая от депрессии, связанной с проблемами в личных отношениях, наблюдался в университетской клинике Дюссельдорфа и еще у нескольких психиатров. 

24 марта 2015 года в 10:00 взлетел самолет. На борту находились командир воздушного судна, 34-летний опытнейший пилот Патрик Зондерхаймер и второй пилот — Андреас Лубиц. В 10:30 командир вышел из кабины в туалет, предлагая второму пилоту взять управление на себя. Второй пилот заблокировал дверь кабины пилотов и вручную переставил автопилот самолета с высоты 11,5 километров на 30 метров.

Лайнер пересек французский берег рядом с городом Тулон и начал снижение. Сначала на 100 метров, а спустя минуту — еще на 550 метров. Диспетчеры пытались связаться с самолетом, но он не отвечал.

В 10:35 командир вернулся к кабине. Он схватил лом и попытался взломать дверь. Среди пассажиров самолета началась паника.

В 10:40 лайнер снизился до 2 000 метров, исчезая с экранов радаров наземных служб, и задел правым крылом гору. В 10:41 самолет врезался в склон горы и взорвался. Никто из пассажиров и членов экипажа не выжил.

Позже в квартире Лубица следователи найдут в мусорной корзине разорванные больничные листы, выписанные пилоту двумя психиатрами за день до трагедии.

Как такое могло произойти и почему врачи не сообщили о болезни пилота авиационным властям — остается загадкой. Известно лишь, что в Европе стартовые медицинские осмотры до недавнего времени были отменены по настоянию профсоюзов. Решение о возможности лететь принимал командир корабля. А в Германии проверки психического состояния пилотов законодательно не были вообще предусмотрены.

Но можно ли предугадать, как поведет себя пилот в момент жесточайшего нервного напряжения? Кто же знал, что капитан пропавшего в 2013 году малазийского Boeing тоже окажется самоубийцей? Следователи, которые пытаются разгадать загадку исчезновения самолета над индийским океаном, приходят к шокирующим выводам. Оказывается, пилот намеренно разгерметизировал салон и после того, как все пассажиры и экипаж погибли, продолжил вести самолет с мертвыми пассажирами — так продолжалось на протяжении нескольких часов. И только когда у него стало заканчиваться топливо, он направил самолет в Индийский океан. Однако следствие еще не закончено, и какие будут окончательные выводы — мы сможем узнать позже.

Под влиянием колоссального стресса и психологической нагрузки во время полета может обостриться любое расстройство организма, считают психиатры. В России во врачебно-летную экспертную комиссию психологи были включены еще в конце 90-х годов. Благодаря им пилотов с выявленными расстройствами психики немедленно отстраняют от полетов. Кроме того, все пилоты проходят обязательный стартовый медицинский контроль. Он позволяет проверить экипаж не только на наличие в крови алкоголя и наркотических средств, но также обнаружить признаки простого ОРВИ, даже если сам пилот пока чувствует себя хорошо.

Череда инцидентов в воздухе заставляет всерьез задуматься о том, что же происходит на большой высоте, за закрытыми дверями кабин экипажа на борту самолетов, переполненных пассажирами, которые доверяют пилотам свою жизнь?

Пилот авиакомпании United Airlines опоздала на рейс и явилась в гражданской одежде и спортивной кепке. Выйдя к пассажирам, женщина сообщила всем по громкой связи, что если они не чувствуют себя в безопасности, то могут уходить.

Большой популярностью в Сети пользовалось видео, героями которого стали пилоты и стюардесса, которая демонстрировала стриптиз прямо во время полета из Европы в Великобританию.

А недавно новостные агентства облетела новость, что во время посадки самолета в Шотландии второй пилот компании EasyJet запаниковал и покинул кабину воздушного судна. Инцидент произошел , когда самолет пошел на снижение. Командир корабля был вынужден самостоятельно совершать посадку. На борту лайнера находилось 148 человек. И это не единственный случай нервного срыва. Например, пилот авиакомпании Jet2 упал в обморок во время рейса.

Кто отвечает сегодня за безопасность наших полетов? И чем причина авиакатастроф последних лет? Не пропустите новый выпуск программы «Скрытые угрозы» на телеканале «Звезда».

На пилотов в крушениях самолета возлагают вину чаще всего. Однако так называемый человеческий фактор действует только в совокупности с другими, например техническими и погодными. Кроме того, растут риски авиапроисшествий из-за различий авиаправил в России и за рубежом. Однако шанс погибнуть на борту самолета по-прежнему сравнительно невелик — из 3,5 млрд перевезенных пассажиров в прошлом году погибли менее шестисот.

Катастрофа самолета FlyDubai 19 марта в Ростове-на-Дону скорее всего произошла по вине пилотов. По предварительным данным Межгосударственного авиационного комитета, сваливание самолета в штопор произошло из-за действий пилотов «в процессе повторного захода на посадку». Решение отказаться от приземления и уйти еще на один круг пилоты приняли на высоте 220 м. Самолет в это время управлялся в ручном режиме. Пилоты перевели стабилизатор лайнера в положение «пикирование», в результате чего самолет начал «энергичное снижение».

На так называемый человеческий фактор по статистике приходится 80–84% авиакатастроф, на отказ техники — 12–14%, все остальное подходит под «окружающую среду», в том числе «погодные условия».

Однако ошибка пилотов, которую авиационные власти называют причиной крушения, обычно работает лишь в совокупности с другими факторами.

«Любой инцидент — это квинтэссенция ошибок. При проведении расследования авиационного происшествия выявляются те ошибки, которые были допущены на разных этапах: подготовка пилота, обслуживание самолета, применение некондиционного топлива, недочеты в аэронавигационном обслуживании и другие моменты», — отмечает «Газете.Ru» директор программ партнерства «Безопасность полетов» Рафаил Аптуков.

«Вот говорят: ошибка экипажа, но все замалчивают, что привело к этой ошибке. Одно дело, когда все у экипажа хорошо и вдруг он ошибся, а другое — когда техника или аэропортовая инфраструктура подводят, потому что старые. Об этом не говорят, об этом замалчивают, проще обвинить экипаж. Особенно если экипаж погиб», — рассуждает пилот первого класса, командир А320 в «Аэрофлоте» Андрей Литвинов.

Говорим на разных языках

Сейчас риски все больше вызываются смежными факторами. «Это, прежде всего, новый уровень взаимодействия инженера-техника с бортовым компьютером во время подготовки к полету, а также пилота и бортового компьютера непосредственно в полете. Ряд последних авиапроисшествий только подтверждает это. В современном самолете от 50 до 80 таких «электронных управленцев» с учетом основной и дублирующей систем», — объясняет член коллегии Росавиации, ректор Московского государственного технического университета гражданской авиации Борис Елисеев.

Он отмечает, что 95% всех пассажирских перевозок выполняются на самолетах, произведенных за пределами России. «Бортовые компьютеры таких воздушных судов оснащены закрытым программным обеспечением. Уже только одно это обстоятельство создает дополнительные риски», — считает Елисеев, добавляя, что следует также подумать и о системе предотвращения кибератак на воздушные суда и центры управления воздушным движением.

Аптуков говорит, что одна из главных проблем в авиации — языковая. Это касается не только зачастую неудовлетворительного знания английского языка, но и разницы в правилах. К примеру, отечественные пилоты, пролетая над Россией, говорят на русском языке, высоту измеряют в метрах, скорость — в километрах. Однако стоит пересечь границу — разговор происходит на английском, скорость измеряется в милях, а высота — в футах.

«Измерение высоты во всем мире считается от уровня моря, а у нас — от аэродрома. Все это тянется еще с советских времен. Примерно в 1992–1994 годах официально насчитывалось 400 различий между мировыми и российскими стандартами», — говорит Аптуков, добавляя, что известная трагедия, произошедшая в 2002 году в небе над Германией, — это тот самый случай, когда причиной стало то, наши правила отличаются от мировых.

«Наши пилоты воспитаны на неукоснительном выполнении рекомендаций наземного персонала, диспетчера. Западные воспитаны на неукоснительном выполнении тех показаний, которые дают бортовые системы», — отметил Аптуков.

Во многом именно этим объясняется авиакатастрофа в районе Боденского озера. Тогда в воздухе столкнулись Ту-154 «Башкирских авиалиний» и грузовой авиалайнер Boeing 757, принадлежащий компании DHL. В результате катастрофы погибли все, кто был на борту обоих самолетов, — 71 человек, в том числе 52 ребенка. Авиадиспетчер дал команду Ту-154 на снижение лишь менее чем за минуту до катастрофы. Почти в одну и ту же секунду среагировали обе бортовые системы предупреждения столкновений. Компьютерный голос приказал пилотам грузового самолета снизить, а российскому экипажу набрать высоту. Однако капитан Ту-154 последовал указаниям диспетчера, а пилот грузового самолета выполнил команду бортовой системы.

Техника подводит меньше

Самолеты последнего поколения намного надежнее, чем, например, четверть века назад. «Произошло несколько революций — в навигации, по конструкции самолета, по двигателям. Гражданская авиация перешла в основном от многодвигательных систем к двухдвигательным. Представляете, что значит лететь над океаном, допустим, Москва — Лос-Анджелес на двухдвигательном самолете? Даже если один двигатель откажет, самолет способен выполнять полет, конечно, потеряв, какие-то качества, но не потеряв самого главного — способности лететь в управляемом полете», — говорит Аптуков.

Однако в истории гражданской авиации есть случаи, когда экипаж подводила именно «железная птица». Так, в марте 1997 года самолет Ан-24, выполнявший рейс из Ставрополя в Трабзон, через несколько минут после взлета на высоте 6 тыс. м развалился в воздухе на части и рухнул на территории Карачаево-Черкесии. На борту находились девять членов экипажа и 41 пассажир, все они погибли. Позже выяснилось, за год до катастрофы этот самолет по причине выработки своего ресурса был снят с полетов в Африке, где находился в аренде. За время полетов в Африке некоторые конструкции хвоста проржавели почти насквозь. Однако в Ставрополе эксплуатационная комиссия продлила самолету срок эксплуатации. После катастрофы и расшифровки «черных ящиков» выяснили одну деталь. В санузле самолета, находившемся в хвостовой части, образовалась течь, а за несколько секунд до катастрофы кто-то из пассажиров зашел в туалет и хлопнул дверью. После этого самолет начал разваливаться.

Статистика показывает, что большинство всех авиационных происшествий произошло на взлете или посадке, очень редко — на эшелоне. «Вот если взять эти два этапа, то самый сложный — это посадка. Хотя наиболее нашумевшие катастрофы в мире были на взлете», — отмечает Аптуков.

Действительно, самой крупной катастрофой по количеству жертв за всю историю авиации, не считая теракта в США 11 сентября 2001 года, является столкновение двух самолетов на взлете. Трагедия произошла 27 марта 1977 года на Тенерифе, когда два Boeing 747 — голландской авиакомпании KLM и американской Pan American — столкнулись на взлетной полосе. К этой катастрофе привело немало факторов: теракт в соседнем аэропорту, акцент диспетчера, туман, отсутствие обзорного локатора в аэропорту, интерференция в эфире, а также импульсивные действия пилота KLM при взлете. В результате этой катастрофы погибли 583 человека.

Не повод для аэрофобии

Несмотря всю серьезность трагедий в воздухе, статистически шанс умереть в самолете по-прежнему невелик.

По данным Международной ассоциации воздушного транспорта (IATA), в прошлом году в мире было перевезено 3,5 млрд человек на 37,6 млн рейсах. По подсчетам портала Аviation-safety, за это время с крупными самолетами (рассчитанными на перевозку 14 пассажиров и более) произошло 14 авиапроисшествий, в которых погибло 186 человек.

В данную статистику не включены две крупные катастрофы, которые произошли с самолетами Germanwings и «Когалымавиа», так как они были классифицированы как «преднамеренные действия незаконного вмешательства». Напомним, в первом случае причиной трагедии стали психические проблемы пилота, во втором — террористический акт. Вместе с этими катастрофами общее число погибших составило 560 человек.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1994 Fairchild Air Force Base B-52 crash, caused by flying the aircraft beyond its operational limits. Here the aircraft is seen in an unrecoverable bank, a split second before the crash. This accident is now used in military and civilian aviation environments as a case study in teaching crew resource management.

Actual flight path (red) of TWA Flight 3 from departure to crash point (controlled flight into terrain). Blue line shows the nominal Las Vegas course, while green is a typical course from Boulder. The pilot inadvertently used the Boulder outbound course instead of the appropriate Las Vegas course.

Departure/destination airports and crash site location of Varig Flight 254 (major navigational error leading to fuel exhaustion). The flight plan was later shown to 21 pilots of major airlines. No fewer than 15 pilots committed the same mistake.

Map of the Linate Airport disaster caused by taking the wrong taxiing route (red instead of green), as control tower had not given clear instructions. The accident occurred in thick fog.

The Tenerife airport disaster now serves as a textbook example.[1] Due to several misunderstandings, the KLM flight tried to take off while the Pan Am flight was still on the runway. The airport was accommodating an unusually large number of commercial airliners, resulting in disruption of the normal use of taxiways.

The «three-pointer» design altimeter is one of the most prone to being misread by pilots (a cause of the UA 389 and G-AOVD crashes).

Pilot error generally refers to an accident in which an action or decision made by the pilot was the cause or a contributing factor that led to the accident, but also includes the pilot’s failure to make a correct decision or take proper action.[2] Errors are intentional actions that fail to achieve their intended outcomes.[3] The Chicago Convention defines the term «accident» as «an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft […] in which […] a person is fatally or seriously injured […] except when the injuries are […] inflicted by other persons.»[4] Hence the definition of «pilot error» does not include deliberate crashing (and such crashes are not classified as accidents).

The causes of pilot error include psychological and physiological human limitations. Various forms of threat and error management have been implemented into pilot training programs to teach crew members how to deal with impending situations that arise throughout the course of a flight.[5]

Accounting for the way human factors influence the actions of pilots is now considered standard practice by accident investigators when examining the chain of events that led to an accident.[5][6]

Description[edit]

Modern accident investigators avoid the words «pilot error», as the scope of their work is to determine the cause of an accident, rather than to apportion blame. Furthermore, any attempt to incriminate the pilots does not consider that they are part of a broader system, which in turn may be accountable for their fatigue, work pressure, or lack of training.[6] The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and its member states, therefore adopted James Reason’s model of causation in 1993 in an effort to better understand the role of human factors in aviation accidents.[7]

Pilot error is nevertheless a major cause of air accidents. In 2004, it was identified as the primary reason for 78.6% of disastrous general aviation (GA) accidents, and as the major cause of 75.5% of GA accidents in the United States.[8][better source needed] There are multiple factors that can cause pilot error; mistakes in the decision-making process can be due to habitual tendencies, biases, as well as a breakdown in the processing of the information coming in. For aircraft pilots, in extreme circumstances these errors are highly likely to result in fatalities.[9]

Causes of pilot error[edit]

Pilots work in complex environments and are routinely exposed to high amounts of situational stress in the workplace, inducing pilot error which may result in a threat to flight safety. While aircraft accidents are infrequent, they are highly visible and often involve significant numbers of fatalities. For this reason, research on causal factors and methodologies of mitigating risk associated with pilot error is exhaustive. Pilot error results from physiological and psychological limitations inherent in humans. «Causes of error include fatigue, workload, and fear as well as cognitive overload, poor interpersonal communications, imperfect information processing, and flawed decision making.»[10] Throughout the course of every flight, crews are intrinsically subjected to a variety of external threats and commit a range of errors that have the potential to negatively impact the safety of the aircraft.[11]

Threats[edit]

The term «threat» is defined as any event «external to flight crew’s influence which can increase the operational complexity of a flight.»[12] Threats may further be broken down into environmental threats and airline threats. Environmental threats are ultimately out of the hands of crew members and the airline, as they hold no influence on «adverse weather conditions, air traffic control shortcomings, bird strikes, and high terrain.»[12] Conversely, airline threats are not manageable by the flight crew, but may be controlled by the airline’s management. These threats include «aircraft malfunctions, cabin interruptions, operational pressure, ground/ramp errors/events, cabin events and interruptions, ground maintenance errors, and inadequacies of manuals and charts.»[12]

Errors[edit]

The term «error» is defined as any action or inaction leading to deviation from team or organizational intentions.[10] Error stems from physiological and psychological human limitations such as illness, medication, stress, alcohol/drug abuse, fatigue, emotion, etc. Error is inevitable in humans and is primarily related to operational and behavioral mishaps.[13] Errors can vary from incorrect altimeter setting and deviations from flight course, to more severe errors such as exceeding maximum structural speeds or forgetting to put down landing or takeoff flaps.

Decision making[edit]

Reasons for negative reporting of accidents include staff being too busy, confusing data entry forms, lack of training and less education, lack of feedback to staff on reported data and punitive organizational cultures.[14] Wiegmann and Shappell invented three cognitive models to analyze approximately 4,000 pilot factors associated with more than 2,000 U.S. Navy aviation mishaps. Although the three cognitive models have slight differences in the types of errors, all three lead to the same conclusion: errors in judgment.[15] The three steps are decision-making, goal-setting, and strategy-selection errors, all of which were highly related to primary accidents.[15] For example, on 28 December 2014, AirAsia Flight 8501, which was carrying seven crew members and 155 passengers, crashed into the Java Sea due to several fatal mistakes made by the captain in the poor weather conditions. In this case, the captain chose to exceed the maximum climb rate for a commercial aircraft, which caused a critical stall from which he was unable to recover.[16]

Threat and error management (TEM)[edit]

TEM involves the effective detection and response to internal or external factors that have the potential to degrade the safety of an aircraft’s operations.[11] Methods of teaching TEM stress replicability, or reliability of performance across recurring situations.[17] TEM aims to prepare crews with the «coordinative and cognitive ability to handle both routine and unforeseen surprises and anomalies.»[17] The desired outcome of TEM training is the development of ‘resilience’. Resilience, in this context, is the ability to recognize and act adaptively to disruptions which may be encountered during flight operations.[18] TEM training occurs in various forms, with varying levels of success. Some of these training methods include data collection using the line operations safety audit (LOSA), implementation of crew resource management (CRM), cockpit task management (CTM), and the integrated use of checklists in both commercial and general aviation. Some other resources built into most modern aircraft that help minimize risk and manage threat and error are airborne collision and avoidance systems (ACAS) and ground proximity warning systems (GPWS).[19] With the consolidation of onboard computer systems and the implementation of proper pilot training, airlines and crew members look to mitigate the inherent risks associated with human factors.

Line operations safety audit (LOSA)[edit]

LOSA is a structured observational program designed to collect data for the development and improvement of countermeasures to operational errors.[20] Through the audit process, trained observers are able to collect information regarding the normal procedures, protocol, and decision making processes flight crews undertake when faced with threats and errors during normal operation. This data driven analysis of threat and error management is useful for examining pilot behavior in relation to situational analysis. It provides a basis for further implementation of safety procedures or training to help mitigate errors and risks.[12] Observers on flights which are being audited typically observe the following:[20]

  • Potential threats to safety
  • How the threats are addressed by the crew members
  • The errors the threats generate
  • How crew members manage these errors (action or inaction)
  • Specific behaviors known to be associated with aviation accidents and incidents

LOSA was developed to assist crew resource management practices in reducing human error in complex flight operations.[12] LOSA produces beneficial data that reveals how many errors or threats are encountered per flight, the number of errors which could have resulted in a serious threat to safety, and correctness of crew action or inaction. This data has proven to be useful in the development of CRM techniques and identification of what issues need to be addressed in training.[12]

Crew resource management (CRM)[edit]

CRM is the «effective use of all available resources by individuals and crews to safely and effectively accomplish a mission or task, as well as identifying and managing the conditions that lead to error.»[21] CRM training has been integrated and mandatory for most pilot training programs, and has been the accepted standard for developing human factors skills for air crews and airlines. Although there is no universal CRM program, airlines usually customize their training to best suit the needs of the organization. The principles of each program are usually closely aligned. According to the U.S. Navy, there are seven critical CRM skills:[21]

  • Decision making – the use of logic and judgement to make decisions based on available information
  • Assertiveness – willingness to participate and state a given position until convinced by facts that another option is more correct
  • Mission analysis – ability to develop short and long term contingency plans
  • Communication – clear and accurate sending and receiving of information, instructions, commands and useful feedback
  • Leadership – ability to direct and coordinate activities of pilots & crew members
  • Adaptability/flexibility – ability to alter course of action due to changing situations or availability of new information
  • Situational awareness – ability to perceive the environment within time and space, and comprehend its meaning

These seven skills comprise the critical foundation for effective aircrew coordination. With the development and use of these core skills, flight crews «highlight the importance of identifying human factors and team dynamics to reduce human errors that lead to aviation mishaps.»[21]

Application and effectiveness of CRM[edit]

Since the implementation of CRM circa 1979, following the need for increased research on resource management by NASA, the aviation industry has seen tremendous evolution of the application of CRM training procedures.[22] The applications of CRM has been developed in a series of generations:

  • First generation: emphasized individual psychology and testing, where corrections could be made to behavior.
  • Second generation: featured a shift in focus to cockpit group dynamics.
  • Third evolution: diversification of scope and an emphasis on training crews in how they must function both in and out of the cockpit.
  • Fourth generation: CRM integrated procedure into training, allowing organizations to tailor training to their needs.
  • Fifth generation (current): acknowledges that human error is inevitable and provides information to improve safety standards.[23]

Today, CRM is implemented through pilot and crew training sessions, simulations, and through interactions with senior ranked personnel and flight instructors such as briefing and debriefing flights. Although it is difficult to measure the success of CRM programs, studies have been conclusive that there is a correlation between CRM programs and better risk management.[23]

Cockpit task management (CTM)[edit]

Multiple sources of information can be taken from one interface here, known as the PFD, or primary flight display from which pilots receive all of the most important data readings

Cockpit task management (CTM) is the «management level activity pilots perform as they initiate, monitor, prioritize, and terminate cockpit tasks.»[24] A ‘task’ is defined as a process performed to achieve a goal (i.e. fly to a waypoint, descend to a desired altitude).[24] CTM training focuses on teaching crew members how to handle concurrent tasks which compete for their attention. This includes the following processes:

  • Task initiation – when appropriate conditions exist
  • Task monitoring – assessment of task progress and status
  • Task prioritization – relative to the importance and urgency for safety
  • Resource allocation – assignment of human and machine resources to tasks which need completion
  • Task interruption – suspension of lower priority tasks for resources to be allocated to higher priority tasks
  • Task resumption – continuing previously interrupted tasks
  • Task termination – the completion or incompletion of tasks

The need for CTM training is a result of the capacity of human attentional facilities and the limitations of working memory. Crew members may devote more mental or physical resources to a particular task which demands priority or requires the immediate safety of the aircraft.[24] CTM has been integrated to pilot training and goes hand in hand with CRM. Some aircraft operating systems have made progress in aiding CTM by combining instrument gauges into one screen. An example of this is a digital attitude indicator, which simultaneously shows the pilot the heading, airspeed, descent or ascent rate and a plethora of other pertinent information. Implementations such as these allow crews to gather multiple sources of information quickly and accurately, which frees up mental capacity to be focused on other, more prominent tasks.

A military pilot reads the pre-flight checklist prior the mission. Checklists ensure that pilots are able to follow operational procedure and aids in memory recall.

Checklists[edit]

The use of checklists before, during and after flights has established a strong presence in all types of aviation as a means of managing error and reducing the possibility of risk. Checklists are highly regulated and consist of protocols and procedures for the majority of the actions required during a flight.[25] The objectives of checklists include «memory recall, standardization and regulation of processes or methodologies.»[25] The use of checklists in aviation has become an industry standard practice, and the completion of checklists from memory is considered a violation of protocol and pilot error. Studies have shown that increased errors in judgement and cognitive function of the brain, along with changes in memory function are a few of the effects of stress and fatigue.[26] Both of these are inevitable human factors encountered in the commercial aviation industry. The use of checklists in emergency situations also contributes to troubleshooting and reverse examining the chain of events which may have led to the particular incident or crash. Apart from checklists issued by regulatory bodies such as the FAA or ICAO, or checklists made by aircraft manufacturers, pilots also have personal qualitative checklists aimed to ensure their fitness and ability to fly the aircraft. An example is the IM SAFE checklist (illness, medication, stress, alcohol, fatigue/food, emotion) and a number of other qualitative assessments which pilots may perform before or during a flight to ensure the safety of the aircraft and passengers.[25] These checklists, along with a number of other redundancies integrated into most modern aircraft operation systems, ensure the pilot remains vigilant, and in turn, aims to reduce the risk of pilot error.

Notable examples[edit]

One of the most famous examples of an aircraft disaster that was attributed to pilot error was the night-time crash of Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 near Miami, Florida on 29 December 1972. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer had become fixated on a faulty landing gear light and had failed to realize that one of the crew had accidentally bumped the flight controls, altering the autopilot settings from level flight to a slow descent. Told by ATC to hold over a sparsely populated area away from the airport while they dealt with the problem (with, as a result, very few lights visible on the ground to act as an external reference), the distracted flight crew did not notice the plane losing height and the aircraft eventually struck the ground in the Everglades, killing 101 of the 176 passengers and crew. The subsequent National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report on the incident blamed the flight crew for failing to monitor the aircraft’s instruments properly. Details of the incident are now frequently used as a case study in training exercises by aircrews and air traffic controllers.

During 2004 in the United States, pilot error was listed as the primary cause of 78.6% of fatal general aviation accidents, and as the primary cause of 75.5% of general aviation accidents overall.[27] For scheduled air transport, pilot error typically accounts for just over half of worldwide accidents with a known cause.[8]

  • 28 July 1945 – A United States Army Air Forces B-25 bomber bound for Newark Airport crashed into the 79th floor of the Empire State Building after the pilot became lost in a heavy fog bank over Manhattan. All three crewmen were killed as well as eleven office workers in the building.
  • 24 December 1958 – BOAC Bristol Britannia 312, registration G-AOVD, crashed as a result of a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), near Winkton, England, while on a test flight. The crash was caused by a combination of bad weather and a failure on the part of both pilots to read the altimeter correctly. The first officer and two other people survived the crash.
  • 3 January 1961 – Aero Flight 311 crashed near Kvevlax, Finland. All twenty-five occupants were killed in the accident, which was the deadliest in Finnish history. An investigation later determined that both pilots were intoxicated during the flight, and may have been interrupted by a passenger at the time of the crash.
  • 28 February 1966 – American astronauts Elliot See and Charles Bassett were killed when their T-38 Talon crashed into a building at Lambert–St. Louis International Airport during bad weather. A NASA investigation concluded that See had been flying too low on his landing approach.
  • 5 May 1972 — Alitalia Flight 112 crashed into Mount Longa after the flight crew did not adhere to approach procedures established by ATC. All 115 occupants perished. This is the worst single-aircraft disaster in Italian history.
  • 29 December 1972 – Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 crashed into the Florida Everglades after the flight crew failed to notice the deactivation of the plane’s autopilot, having been distracted by their own attempts to solve a problem with the landing gear. Out of 176 occupants, 75 survived the crash.
  • 27 March 1977 – The Tenerife airport disaster: a senior KLM pilot failed to hear, understand or follow instructions from the control tower, causing two Boeing 747s to collide on the runway at Tenerife. A total of 583 people were killed in the deadliest aviation accident in history.
  • 28 December 1978 – United Airlines Flight 173: a flight simulator instructor captain allowed his Douglas DC-8 to run out of fuel while investigating a landing gear problem. United Airlines subsequently changed their policy to disallow «simulator instructor time» in calculating a pilot’s «total flight time». It was thought that a contributory factor to the accident is that an instructor can control the amount of fuel in simulator training so that it never runs out.
  • 13 January 1982 – Air Florida Flight 90, a Boeing 737-200 with 79 passengers and crew, crashed into the 14th Street Bridge and careened into the Potomac River shortly after taking off from Washington National Airport, killing 75 passengers and crew, and four motorists on the bridge. The NTSB report blamed the flight crew for not properly employing the plane’s de-icing system.
  • 19 February 1985 – The crew of China Airlines Flight 006 lost control of their Boeing 747SP over the Pacific Ocean, after the No. 4 engine flamed out. The aircraft descended 30,000 feet in two-and-a-half minutes before control was regained. There were no fatalities but there were several injuries, and the aircraft was badly damaged.
  • 16 August 1987 – The crew of Northwest Airlines Flight 255 omitted their taxi checklist and failed to deploy the aircraft’s flaps and slats. Subsequently, the McDonnell Douglas MD-82 did not gain enough lift on takeoff and crashed into the ground, killing all but one of the 155 people on board, as well as two people on the ground. The sole survivor was a four-year-old girl named Cecelia Cichan, who was seriously injured.
  • 28 August 1988 – The Ramstein airshow disaster: a member of an Italian aerobatic team misjudged a maneuver, causing a mid-air collision. Three pilots and 67 spectators on the ground were killed.
  • 31 August 1988 – Delta Air Lines Flight 1141 crashed on takeoff after the crew forgot to deploy the flaps for increased lift. Of the 108 passengers and crew on board, fourteen were killed.
  • 8 January 1989 – In the Kegworth air disaster, a fan blade broke off in the left engine of a new Boeing 737-400, but the pilots mistakenly shut down the right engine. The left engine eventually failed completely and the crew were unable to restart the right engine before the aircraft crashed. Instrumentation on the 737-400 was different from earlier models, but no flight simulator for the new model was available in Britain.
  • 3 September 1989 – The crew of Varig Flight 254 made a series of mistakes so that their Boeing 737 ran out of fuel hundreds of miles off-course above the Amazon jungle. Thirteen died in the ensuing crash landing.
  • 21 October 1989 – Tan-Sahsa Flight 414 crashed into a hill near Toncontin International Airport in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, because of a bad landing procedure by the pilot, killing 131 of the 146 passengers and crew.
  • 14 February 1990 – Indian Airlines Flight 605 crashed into a golf course short of the runway near Hindustan Airport, India. The flight crew failed to pull up after radio callouts of how close they were into the ground. The plane struck a golf course and an embankment, bursting into flames. Of the 146 occupants on the plane, 92 died, including both flight crew. 54 occupants survived the crash.
  • 24 November 1992 – China Southern Airlines Flight 3943 departed Guangzhou on a 55-minute flight to Guilin. During the descent towards Guilin, at an altitude of 7,000 feet (2,100 m), the captain attempted to level off the plane by raising the nose and the plane’s auto-throttle was engaged for descent. However, the crew failed to notice that the number 2 power lever was at idle, which led to an asymmetrical power condition. The plane crashed on descent to Guilin Airport, killing all 141 on board.
  • 23 March 1994 – Aeroflot Flight 593, an Airbus A310-300, crashed on its way to Hong Kong. The captain, Yaroslav Kudrinsky, invited his two children into the cockpit, and permitted them to sit at the controls, against airline regulations. His sixteen-year-old son, Eldar Kudrinsky, accidentally disconnected the autopilot, causing the plane to bank to the right before diving. The co-pilot brought up the plane too far, causing it to stall and start a flat spin. The pilots eventually recovered the plane, but it crashed into a forest, killing all 75 people on board.
  • 24 June 1994 – B-52 crashes in Fairchild Air Force Base. The crash was largely attributed to the personality and behavior of Lt Col Arthur «Bud» Holland, the pilot in command, and delayed reactions to the earlier incidents involving this pilot. After past histories, Lt Col Mark McGeehan, a USAF squadron commander, refused to allow any of his squadron members to fly with Holland unless he (McGeehan) was also on the aircraft. This crash is now used in military and civilian aviation environments as a case study in teaching crew resource management.
  • 30 June 1994 – Airbus Industrie Flight 129, a certification test flight of the Airbus A330-300, crashed at Toulouse-Blagnac Airport. While simulating an engine-out emergency just after takeoff with an extreme center of gravity location, the pilots chose improper manual settings which rendered the autopilot incapable of keeping the plane in the air, and by the time the captain regained manual control, it was too late. The aircraft was destroyed, killing the flight crew, a test engineer, and four passengers. The investigative board concluded that the captain was overworked from earlier flight testing that day, and was unable to devote sufficient time to the preflight briefing. As a result, Airbus had to revise the engine-out emergency procedures.
  • 2 July 1994 – USAir Flight 1016 crashed into a residential house due to spatial disorientation. 37 passengers were killed and the airplane was destroyed.
  • 20 December 1995 – American Airlines Flight 965, a Boeing 757-200 with 155 passengers and eight crew members, departed Miami approximately two hours behind schedule at 1835 Eastern Standard Time (EST). The investigators believe that the pilot’s unfamiliarity with the modern technology installed in the Boeing 757-200 may have played a role. The pilots did not know their location in relation to a radio beacon in Tulua. The aircraft was equipped to provide that information electronically, but according to sources familiar with the investigation, the pilot apparently did not know how to access the information. The captain input the wrong coordinates, and the aircraft crashed into the mountains, killing 159 of the 163 people on board.
  • 8 May 1997 – China Southern Airlines Flight 3456 crashed into the runway at Shenzhen Huangtian Airport during the crew’s second go-around attempt, killing 35 of the 74 people on board. The crew had unknowingly violated landing procedures, due to heavy weather.
  • 6 August 1997 – Korean Air Flight 801, a Boeing 747-300, crashed into Nimitz Hill, three miles from Guam International Airport, killing 228 of the 254 people on board. The captain’s failure to properly conduct a non-precision approach contributed to the accident. The NTSB said pilot fatigue was a possible factor.
  • 26 September 1997 — Garuda Indonesia Flight 152, an Airbus A300, crashed into a ravine, killing all 234 people on board. The NTSC concluded that the crash was caused when the pilots turned the aircraft in the wrong direction, along with ATC error. Low visibility and failure of the GPWS to activate were cited as contributing factors to the accident.
  • 12 October 1997 – Singer John Denver died when his newly-acquired Rutan Long-EZ home-built aircraft crashed into the Pacific Ocean off Pacific Grove, California. The NTSB indicated that Denver lost control of the aircraft while attempting to manipulate the fuel selector handle, which had been placed in an inaccessible position by the aircraft’s builder. The NTSB cited Denver’s unfamiliarity with the aircraft’s design as a cause of the crash.
  • 16 February 1998 – China Airlines Flight 676 was attempting to land at Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport but had initiate a go-around due to the bad weather conditions. However, the pilots accidentally disengaged the autopilot and did not notice for 11 seconds. When they did notice, the Airbus A300 had entered a stall. The aircraft crashed into a highway and residential area, and exploded, killing all 196 people on board, as well as seven people on the ground.
  • 16 July 1999 – John F. Kennedy, Jr. died when his plane, a Piper Saratoga, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts. The NTSB officially declared that the crash was caused by «the pilot’s failure to maintain control of his airplane during a descent over water at night, which was a result of spatial disorientation». Kennedy did not hold a certification for IFR flight, but did continue to fly after weather conditions obscured visual landmarks.
  • 31 August 1999 – Lineas Aéreas Privadas Argentinas (LAPA) flight 3142 crashed after an attempted take-off with the flaps retracted, killing 63 of the 100 occupants on the plane as well as two people on the ground.
  • 31 October 2000 – Singapore Airlines Flight 006 was a Boeing 747-412 that took off from the wrong runway at the then Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport. It collided with construction equipment on the runway, bursting into flames and killing 83 of its 179 occupants.
  • 12 November 2001 – American Airlines Flight 587 encountered heavy turbulence and the co-pilot over-applied the rudder pedal, turning the Airbus A300 from side to side. The excessive stress caused the rudder to fail. The A300 spun and hit a residential area, crushing five houses and killing 265 people. Contributing factors included wake turbulence and pilot training.
  • 24 November 2001 – Crossair Flight 3597 crashed into a forest on approach to runway 28 at Zurich Airport. This was caused by Captain Lutz descending below the minimum safe altitude of 2400 feet on approach to the runway.
  • 15 April 2002 – Air China Flight 129, a Boeing 767-200, crashed near Busan, South Korea killing 128 of the 166 people on board. The pilot and co-pilot had been flying too low.
  • 25 October 2002 – Eight people, including U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, were killed in a crash near Eveleth, Minnesota. The NTSB concluded that «the flight crew did not monitor and maintain minimum speed.
  • 3 January 2004 – Flash Airlines Flight 604 dived into the Red Sea shortly after takeoff, killing all 148 people on board. The captain had been experiencing vertigo and had not noticed that his control column was slanted to the right. The Boeing 737 banked until it was no longer able to stay in the air. However, the investigation report was disputed.
  • 26 February 2004 – A Beech 200 carrying Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski crashed, killing the president and eight other passengers. The crash investigation ruled that the accident was caused by «procedural mistakes by the crew» during the landing approach.
  • 14 August 2005 – The pilots of Helios Airways Flight 522 lost consciousness, most likely due to hypoxia caused by failure to switch the cabin pressurization to «Auto» during the pre-flight preparations. The Boeing 737-300 crashed after running out of fuel, killing all on board.
  • 16 August 2005 – The crew of West Caribbean Airways Flight 708 unknowingly (and dangerously) decreased the speed of the McDonnell Douglas MD-82, causing it to enter a stall. The situation was incorrectly handled by the crew, with the captain believing that the engines had flamed out, while the first officer, who was aware of the stall, attempted to correct him. The aircraft crashed into the ground near Machiques, Venezuela, killing all 160 people on board.
  • 3 May 2006 – Armavia Flight 967 lost control and crashed into the Black Sea while approaching Sochi-Adler Airport in Russia, killing all 113 people on board. The pilots were fatigued and flying under stressful conditions. Their stress levels were pushed over the limit, causing them to lose their situational awareness.
  • 27 August 2006 – Comair Flight 5191 failed to become airborne and crashed at Blue Grass Airport, after the flight crew mistakenly attempted to take off from a secondary runway that was much shorter than the intended takeoff runway. All but one of the 50 people on board the plane died, including the 47 passengers. The sole survivor was the flight’s first officer, James Polhinke.
  • 1 January 2007 – The crew of Adam Air Flight 574 were preoccupied with a malfunction of the inertial reference system, which diverted their attention from the flight instruments, allowing the increasing descent and bank angle to go unnoticed. Appearing to have become spatially disoriented, the pilots did not detect and appropriately arrest the descent soon enough to prevent loss of control. This caused the aircraft to break up in mid air and crash into the water, killing all 102 people on board.[28]
  • 7 March 2007 – Garuda Indonesia Flight 200: poor Crew Resource Management and the failure to extend the flaps led the aircraft to land at an «unimaginable» speed and run off the end of the runway after landing. Of the 140 occupants, 22 were killed.
  • 17 July 2007 – TAM Airlines Flight 3054: the thrust reverser on the right engine of the Airbus A320 was jammed. Although both crew members were aware, the captain used an outdated braking procedure, and the aircraft overshot the runway and crashed into a building, killing all 187 people on board, as well as 12 people on the ground.
  • 20 August 2008 – The crew of Spanair Flight 5022 failed to deploy the MD-82’s flaps and slats. The flight crashed after takeoff, killing 154 out of the 172 passengers and crew on board.
  • 12 February 2009 – Colgan Air Flight 3407 (flying as Continental Connection) entered a stall and crashed into a house in Clarence Center, New York, due to lack of situational awareness of air speed by the captain and first officer and the captain’s improper reaction to the plane’s stick-shaker stall warning system. All 49 people on board the plane died, as well as one person inside the house.
  • 1 June 2009 – Air France Flight 447 entered a stall and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean following pitot tube failures and improper control inputs by the first officer. All 216 passengers and twelve crew members died.
  • 10 April 2010 – 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash: during a descent towards Russia’s Smolensk North Airport, the flight crew of the Polish presidential jet ignored automatic warnings and attempted a risky landing in heavy fog. The Tupolev Tu-154M descended too low and crashed into a nearby forest; all of the occupants were killed, including Polish president Lech Kaczynski, his wife Maria Kaczynska, and numerous government and military officials.
  • 12 May 2010 – Afriqiyah Airways Flight 771 The aircraft crashed about 1,200 meters (1,300 yd; 3,900 ft) short of Runway 09, outside the perimeter of Tripoli International Airport, killing all but one of the 104 people on board. The sole survivor was a 9-year-old boy named Ruben Van Assouw. On 28 February 2013, the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority announced that the crash was caused by pilot error. Factors that contributed to the crash were lacking/insufficient crew resource management, sensory illusions, and the first officer’s inputs to the aircraft side stick; fatigue could also have played a role in the accident. The final report cited the following causes: the pilots’ lack of a common action plan during the approach, the final approach being continued below the Minimum Decision Altitude without ground visual reference being acquired; the inappropriate application of flight control inputs during the go-around and after the Terrain Awareness and Warning System had been activated; and the flight crew’s failure to monitor and control the flight path.
  • 22 May 2010 – Air India Express Flight 812 overshot the runway at Mangalore Airport, killing 158 people. The plane touched down 610 meters (670 yd) from the usual touchdown point after a steep descent. CVR recordings showed that the captain had been sleeping and had woken up just minutes before the landing. His lack of alertness made the plane land very quickly and steeply and it ran off the end of the tabletop runway.
  • 28 July 2010 – The captain of Airblue Flight 202 became confused with the heading knob and thought that he had carried out the correct action to turn the plane. However, due to his failure to pull the heading knob, the turn was not executed. The Airbus A321 went astray and slammed into the Margalla Hills, killing all 152 people on board.
  • 20 June 2011 – RusAir Flight 9605 crashed onto a motorway while on its final approach to Petrozavodsk Airport in western Russia, after the intoxicated navigator encouraged the captain to land in heavy fog. Only five of the 52 people on board the plane survived the crash.
  • 6 July 2013 – Asiana Airlines Flight 214 tail struck the seawall short of runway 28L at San Francisco International Airport. Of the 307 passengers and crew, three people died and 187 were injured when the aircraft slid down the runway. Investigators said the accident was caused by lower than normal approach speed and incorrect approach path during landing.
  • 23 July 2014 – TransAsia Airways Flight 222 brushed trees and crashed into six houses in a residential area in Xixi Village, Penghu Island, Taiwan. Of the 58 people on board the flight, only ten people survived the crash. The captain was overconfident with his skill and intentionally descended and rolled the plane to the left. Crew members did not realize that they were at a dangerously low altitude and the plane was about to impact terrain until two seconds before the crash.
  • 28 December 2014 — Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501 crashed into the Java Sea as a result of an aerodynamic stall due to pilot error. The aircraft exceeded the climb rate, way beyond its operational limits. All 155 passengers and 7 crew members on board were killed.
  • 6 February 2015 – TransAsia Airways Flight 235: one of the ATR 72’s engines experienced a flameout. As airplanes are able to fly on one engine alone, the pilot then shut down one of the engines. However, he accidentally shut off the engine that was functioning correctly and left the plane powerless, at which point he unsuccessfully tried to restart both engines. The plane then clipped a bridge and plummeted into the Keelung river as the pilot tried to avoid city terrain, killing 43 of the 58 on board.

See also[edit]

  • Airmanship
  • Controlled flight into terrain
  • Environmental causes of aviation stress
  • Human factors in aviation safety
  • Human reliability
  • Jet lag
  • Korean Air Lines Flight 007
  • Pilot fatigue
  • Sensory illusions in aviation
  • Spatial disorientation
  • Stress in the aviation industry
  • Threat and error management
  • User error
  • Kenya Airways Flight 507

References[edit]

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  27. ^ «2005 Joseph T. Nall Report» (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 February 2007. Retrieved 12 February 2007.
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По данным Межгосударственного авиационного комитета за 2018 год, в 11 странах, входящих в МАК, произошло 20 авиапроисшествий, связанных с человеческим фактором, и только четыре — из-за отказа техники. Но даже человеческий фактор почти всегда предполагает и другие слагаемые.

Чем руководствовались пилоты «Сухого»

Деятельность пилотов по управлению самолётом регламентируют не только федеральные законы и подзаконные акты, но и специальная инструкция, так называемое РЛЭ (FCOM) — руководство по лётной эксплуатации, в нашем случае RRJ-95 «Сухого Суперджета». Инструкция — служебный документ. В ней содержатся все технические характеристики воздушного судна, алгоритмы действия экипажа в штатных ситуациях. Нормы показателей, при которых должны осуществляться подготовка к взлёту, взлёт, посадка и другие стандартные эксплуатационные процедуры. И главное, чётко прописаны действия в аварийных ситуациях. Содержание документа является собственностью ЗАО «Гражданские самолёты Сухого» и не может быть использовано без согласия компании. Это указано прямо на обложке РЛЭ. Впрочем, этот ведомственный документ можно легко отыскать в свободном доступе на просторах Интернета.

Строгий регламент или импровизация?

Фото: © Следственный комитет РФ

Фото: © Следственный комитет РФ

Лайф попросил командира воздушного судна и автора телеграм-канала Flying Upside Down ответить, какая из версий катастрофы, по его мнению, наиболее вероятна.

Что касается причин воспламенения топлива и разрушения конструкции воздушного судна, то здесь всё очевидно. В процессе посадки было допущено четыре повторных отделения и превышение максимальной вертикальной скорости на касании. В случае, если пилоты испытывали проблемы с пилотированием самолёта по причине нарушения балансировки или управляемости, они должны были сообщить об этом. Этого сделано не было, поэтому распространённое мнение о сложности управления самолётом — лишь домыслы.

Лайф: По правилам, посадку проводит второй пилот. Задача командира воздушного судна — принимать решения и контролировать действия напарника. Кто управлял лайнером при посадке — КВС Денис Евдокимов или помощник?

— Думаю, в подобной ситуации ни один КВС не доверит выполнение посадки второму пилоту.

Лайф: Четыре повторных отделения и превышение максимальной скорости — это ошибка экипажа?

— Безусловно, да. Думаю, что истерия «SuperJet — г…но» не имеет под собой никаких оснований, поскольку до момента жёсткой посадки самолёт прекрасно летел, а значит, обеспечивал безопасность экипажа и пассажиров.

Заслуженный лётчик-испытатель Герой России Магомед Толбоев специально для Лайфа проанализировал действия пилотов.

— Лётчики на момент посадки уже не управляли самолётом, у них началась паника. Самолёт садился на слишком большой скорости, и они его искусственно ударили, просто не знали, что с ним делать.

Должностные инструкции устанавливают правила, по которым, например, главным пилотом может стать лицо, имеющее высшее профессиональное (лётное) образование и стаж работы на командно-лётных должностях не менее трёх лет, а вторым пилотом — лицо, имеющее высшее профессиональное (лётное) образование и стаж лётной работы не менее двух лет.

Командир злополучного «суперджета» Денис Евдокимов, 1976 года рождения, окончил Балашовское лётное училище в 1998-м. После выпуска проходил службу в частях авиации Пограничных войск ФСБ. Летал на Ил-76. В целом налетал 6800 часов, из них на «Сухом» — 1400 часов.

Второй пилот «суперджета», Максим Кузнецов, 1983 года рождения, окончил Ульяновский филиал Сасовского лётного училища в 2016 году и сразу устроился в «Аэрофлот». Никаких нареканий по работе у второго пилота не было.

Ранее Лайф рассказывал о человеческом факторе в авиации, когда жертвами неверно принятого решения экипажа Boeing 737 чуть было не стали 170 человек. Тогда в Сочинском аэропорту самолёт выкатился за пределы ВПП, а впоследствии загорелся. Так что же мешает нынешним пилотам действовать в соответствии с регламентом, держать себя в руках и принимать верные решения в критической ситуации?

Необкатанные джеты. Недоученные люди

Фото: © AP Photo / Marina Lystseva

Фото: © AP Photo / Marina Lystseva

На специализированных авиафорумах действующие капитаны воздушных судов описывают джет как абсолютно безопасный и ни в чём не уступающий другим самолёт. Круче Airbus и Boeing, но недоработанный. Лётчики жалуются, что инженеров и техников по обслуживанию SSJ тоже не хватает. Недоработки по «детским болезням» самолёта мелкие — но много. Недостаточный налёт у джетов может быть не только из-за длительного техобслуживания, но и из-за нехватки главных пилотов. А пилоты проходят подготовку для джетов на тренажёре.

По мнению лётчика-испытателя Магомеда Толбоева, тренажёр пилоту даёт мало и даже может навредить. Теряется реальность, связь с землёй и небом. Опасность ещё и в том, что снижается ответственность, ведь симулятор позволяет разбиться сколько угодно раз, и, когда такой лётчик пересаживается на настоящую технику, психика пилота воспринимает реальность как детскую игру.

На форумах, посвящённых воздушному судну «Сухой», пилоты отмечают, что переучиться, например, на 777-й (имеется в виду Boeing. — Прим. Лайфа) без командирского опыта и общего налёта в размере 4000 часов невозможно.

Лётчик-испытатель Толбоев прокомментировал Лайфу подготовку молодых пилотов: «Не знаю, как в «Аэрофлоте», это уважаемая авиакомпания, но всё можно за деньги. Откуда, например, в 23 года 27 000 налёта? Приписывают нули. Толбоев отмечает и разницу в подготовке пилотов: «Раньше, в СССР, до такого уровня самолёта, как Ту-134 (примерный уровень нынешнего джета. — Прим. Лайфа), ввод лётчика в строй составлял 8 лет. Сейчас — 8 месяцев«.

Портрет российского лётчика на фоне всех проблем

Фото: © flickr / SuperJet International

Пилоты и авиаэксперты сходятся в одном — проблем у Росавиации немало. Дефицит пилотов гражданской авиации, госмонополия на обучение, хотя уровень государственного образования, мягко говоря, хромает. Как лётчик научится летать, если отсутствует техника? В Ульяновском лётном институте, например, отрабатывают навыки пилотирования на западных маленьких самолётах. Больших просто нет. И закупаются в основном западные самолёты. Самые опытные пилоты уходят к иностранцам, которые переманивают большими деньгами именно рейтинговых лётчиков.

— Как я вижу современного лётчика… Стоит самолёт, стоит пилот с компьютером. Лётчик ничего не знает о самолёте перед ним: ни технические характеристики, ни практику. Думает — ничего страшного, спрошу у компьютера. Сколько весит «Сухой джет«? Компьютер отвечает. Это как внук деду телефон купил и на кнопки научил тыкать, но ни знаний, ни понятия процессов нет. Лётчик сейчас — не лётчик, а обыкновенный оператор. Вывод — так можно из крупных технических вузов взять айтишников, посадить в кабину самолёта. Самолёт сам рулит, сам летает. Зачем тратить такие деньги на обучение, если разницы нет, — раздражённо пояснил Лайфу лётчик-испытатель Толбоев.

Следствие рассматривает ошибку пилота в качестве основной версии, к тому же склоняются и эксперты. Но трагедия явно сложилась ещё из пары реалий: недоработанность нового самолёта, помноженная на все проблемы российской авиации.

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